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Abstract
This Article has as its topic a legal assessment of Poland’s aspirations towards full Community
membership. This Article also postulates that the EC must continue to be mindful of maintaining
the current momentum of rendering meaningful economic, legal, and political assistance to Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and Hungary and so transform previously successful short- and medium-term
measures into an effective long-term plan, with a view toward furthering these countries’ quests
for membership.
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INTRODUCTION
The year 1992-much heralded and long awaited-has ar-
rived and ended. At the end of 1992, the European Economic
Community (the "EEC," "EC," or "Community")' was to
transmogrify into a single, colossal market of 340,000,000
Europeans, characterized by free movement of goods, persons,
services, and capital. 2 This ultimate coalescing of free and un-
hampered trade unfolded pursuant to the amendments to the
1. The term "Community" refers to three "communities." Treaty Establishing
the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd.
5179-lI), 298 U.N.T.S. 3 (1958), amended by Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1
(1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [treaty as amended referred to hereinafter as EEC
Treaty]; Treaty Instituting the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951,
261 U.N.T.S. 140 (1957) [hereinafter ECSC], founded in 1951; and the EURATOM,
Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 167 (unofficial English translation). Over the years, the term "Community"
has come to signify primarily the European Economic Community and the two have
become loosely interchangeable.
2. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 8b.
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EEC Treaty in the Single European Act (the "SEA").' As 1993
begins, it appears that the single market will indeed be a real-
ity.
In designing and implementing the 1992 objectives, Com-
munity leaders did not, nor could they have, reckoned with
1989. Described by certain scholars as the "Autumn of the
Peoples," 4 1990 and 1991, with breathtaking speed, ushered in
geopolitical redefinitions of the eastern end of the European,
continent. The Community's brainchild, the single market,
will thus be born into a radically altered and infinitely more
complex geopolitical context than formerly envisaged. A new
Europe has emerged, the economic, political, and security pa-
rameters of which are far from fully solidified.
The constituent components of the new Europe, those
countries formerly generically labeled "Eastern European"
countries, have assumed a new nomenclature. "East Central
Europe," also most recently referred to as the "Visegrad
Trio," is generally understood as comprising Poland, Czecho-
slovakia, and Hungary.5 Czechoslovakia is now the Czech and
Slovak Republic, or CSFR.6 The "Baltic states" in turn com-
prise Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia. Yugoslavia has dis-
integrated into subparts of its former self, as has the Soviet
Union, as evidenced by the reappearance of Ukraine, Byelorus-
sia, and others in the "Confederation of Independent States"
(the "CIS"). New nations will continue to emerge, further al-
tering the geopolitical landscape. All of the new players on the
horizon, however, share the same propensity for looking to the
3. Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 (amending
EEC Treaty, supra note 1).
4. Wiktor Osiatynski, Revolutions in Eastern Europe, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 823, 824
(1991); see generally Charles Gati, East-Central Europe: The Morning After, 69 FOREIGN
AFF. 129 (Winter 1990/1991).
5. The term refers to a meeting held by the three countries in Visegrad, Hun-
gary in February 1991 to discuss common issues such as security and economic poli-
cies.
6. Czech and Slovak Governments Open Second Round of Talks, CTK National News
Wire, Oct. 25, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File. Czech and Slovak
officials are currently negotiating aspects of future cooperation after the federation
splits, such as the establishment of a customs union, a monetary union, and partial
agreements concerning the movement of persons and goods. Id. As this Article was
going to print, Czechoslovakia had split into two new nations, the Czech Republic
and Slovakia. Michael Matthews, The Clintons, A Czech-out, Maybe a Knockout-and An-
nie, Too.... NEWSDAY, Jan. 1, 1993, at 94.
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West for everything from the codification of their newly
emerging democratic constitutions,- to hard cash handouts,
credits, and various forms of aid. In looking to the West,
moreover, the gaze of these new countries has understandably
fixated on the "success story" that is the European Commu-
nity. The East Central European states separately articulated
as early as 1989 their ultimate objective of achieving full Com-
munity membership.7 It is with these three states that the EC,
in mid-December 1991, concluded three distinct "association
agreements,"' which in EC parlance have been denominated
as "the Europe Agreements," ostensibly to reflect the nature
of the unique new types of links between these three countries
and the EC. 9 The preambles to the Europe Agreements ex-
pressly recognize ,the membership goals of the associates, but
fall far short of committing the Community to extending future
membership privileges to any one of the associate countries.'
With the Baltic and even some of the CIS countries lining up
behind them, there may be several dozen candidates for EC
membership by 1996 since concurrently, and at least in part
for some 'of the same reasons, an ever-increasing number of
Western European countries is seeking or intends to seek ad-
mission to the EC.
This Article has as its topic a legal assessment of Poland's
7. EEC/Eastern Europe: Commission Prepares Talks on Closer Cooperation, Eur. Rep.,
No. 1578, Apr. 12, 1990, at 8, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, ALLEUR File.
8, See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 238. Association agreements are provided
for in Article 238 of the EEC Treaty as follows:
The Community may conclude with a third State, a union of States or
an international organization agreements establishing an association involv-
ing reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special proce-
dures.
These agreements shall be concluded by the Council, acting unani-
mously and after receiving the assent of the European Parliament which
shall act by an absolute majority of its component members. "
Where such agreements call for amendments to this Treaty, these
amendments shall first be adopted in accordance with the procedure laid
down in Article 236.
Id.
9. Commission Press Release, IP (91) 1033 (Dec. 23, 1990). Czechoslovakia,
which split in 1993, would like to see its association agreement transferred to both
new states. CSFR Delegation Leaves for EC-Visegrad Talks in London, CTK National News
Wire, Oct. 27, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
10. O.J. L 114 (1992) (Poland), OJ. L 115 (1992) (Czechoslovakia), and O.J. L
116 (1992) (Hungary) [hereinafter Europe Agreements].
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aspirations towards full Community membership. Any such
evaluation must, a fortiori, include an examination of how the
Single European Act, as yet untested on the issue of accession,
may impact upon the legal aspects of "association" agreements
such as that concluded with Poland; how the new European
landscape has caused the Community to reexamine its raison
d'etre and arguably prompted the controversial Treaty on Euro-
pean Union," reached in Maastricht, the Netherlands, in late
1991; the current and probable wait-list for membership; the
"boomerang" impact of this expanding wait-list on Commu-
nity policies concerning accession; the genesis of Poland's,
Hungary's, and Czechoslovakia's current status as "associates"
of the Community; the legal and political processes that re-
sulted in the terms and conditions set forth 'in the particular
Europe Agreement that was concluded with Poland; the Eu-
rope Agreement as a. probable critical path toward member-
ship; and a discussion of the new legal mechanisms that Poland
must successfully adopt and implement prior to any future ac-
cession.
This Article also postulates that the EC must continue to
be mindful of maintaining the current momentum of rendering
meaningful economic, legal, and political assistance to Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and Hungary and so transform previously suc-
cessful short- and medium-term measures into an effective
long-term plan, with a view toward furthering these countries'
quests for membership. This Article urges that the Commu-
nity refrain from the dilatory tactics and stopgap measures it
has evinced vis-a'-vis certain earlier applicants such as Turkey.
It also suggests that prior accessions to the Community, in par-
ticular those of the less affluent Member States such as Greece,
Portugal, and Spain, demonstrate the feasibility and desirabil-
ity of allowing Poland to join. The viewpoint espoused in this
Article, however, does not extend so far as to suggest, as have
other legal commentators, that only a guarantee of full Com-
munity membership can ensure the completion of the transi-
tion to democracy and a market economy in countries Such as
Poland.12 Irrespective of Community accession, Poland is
11. This is in addition to monetary union. See infra notes 89-90 and accompany-
ing text.
12. Cf Romana Sadurska, Reshaping Europe or "How To Keep Poor Cousins in (Their)
Home": A Comment on The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE LJ. 2501 (1991)
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acutely aware of the economic quagmire caused by Communist
policies and sees no alternative but to pursue democracy and a
free market economy.' 3 The argument that the EC has a moral
imperative 14 to ensure membership is persuasive, albeit un-
likely to be a determining factor. It would simply appear
highly counterproductive for the EC to allow the next decade
to lay the basis of a new bi-polarization of Europe, even in the
form of a primarily economic barrier. Western Europe's self-
interest in stability in the East should justify certain sacrifices
on its part. The Community should therefore continue its pol-
icy of investing in the democratic future of Europe15 and ac-
tively prepare those of the new democracies that are objec-
tively capable of being integrated into the West, so as to fully
realize the original objectives of the founders of the Commu-
nity. Only then will true peace and prosperity be realized on
the European continent.
I. KNOCKING AT THE EC'S DOOR-THE RECENT
CONVERGENCE OF EUROPEAN GEOPOLITICAL
TRENDS RESULTING IN THE CURRENT
WAIT-LIST
A. Bases of the European Economic Community
The phenomenon of an ever-increasing line of would-be
members standing outside the gates of the EC is the obvious
and most visible result of the sudden convergence of largely
unforeseen and unplanned historical events in that part of Eu-
rope lying geographically east of the EC. The total economic
and political collapse of the communist system of centrally
planned economies, juxtaposed with the EC's steady, progres-
sive realization of carefully orchestrated and meticulously
crafted Community concepts such as "single internal market,"
"economic monetary union," "European Political Coopera-
tion," and "political union," evidences cause for concern.
(commenting on J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE LJ. 2403
(1991)).
13. See Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, Poland. No Retreat From Democracy, WASH. POST,
Feb. 15, 1992, at A26.
14. See generally GILES MERRITT, EASTERN EUROPE AND THE USSR: THE CHAL-
LENGE OF FREEDOM (1991).
15. Prodromos Dagtoglou, The Southern Enlargement of the European Community, 21
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 149 (1984).
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The EEC Treaty's provisions governing accession to the
EC are deceptively simple. Because under Article 237 "[a]ny
European State may apply" for membership,' 6 it would appear
that the sole criterion is for an applicant state to be Euro-
pean.17 Successive expansions of the Community have clari-
fied that principles of pluralist government and respect for
human rights are essential prerequisites for accession. 8 As
ProfessorJochen Frowein aptly points out in his analysis of the
EEC Treaty's implicit requirement that the sine qua non of
Community membership is "a republican form of govern-
ment," today's European Community "cannot be understood
without taking into account European history after 1933."'
Clearly the same holds true for any understanding of the Com-
munity of the future. The discussion of recent events occur-
ring in Europe, and the Community's reaction thereto, is
grounded in the conviction that any projected future parame-
ters of the Community are by definition intertwined with and
fully dependent upon the same fundamental legal principles
that led to its original inception. The first President of the EC
Commission, Walter Hallstein, identified two such governing
principles, the rule of law and democracy. 20 Accordingly, the
preamble to the EEC Treaty2' refers to the determination of its
16. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 237. Article 237 of the EEC Treaty states that
[a]ny European State may apply to become a member of the Commu-
nity. It shall address its application to the Council, which shall act unani-
mously after consulting the Commission and after receiving the assent of
the European Parliament which shall act by an absolute majority of its com-
ponent members.
The conditions of admission and the adjustments to this Treaty necessi-
tated thereby shall be the subject of an agreement between the Member
States and the applicant State. This agreement shall be submitted for ratifi-
cation by all the Contracting States in accordance with their respective con-
stitutional requirements.
Id.
17. Dagtoglou, supra note 15, at 149.
18. Id.
19. Jochen Abr. Frowein, The European Community and the Requirement of a Republi-
can Form of Government, 82 MIcH. L. REV. 1311 (1984).
20. Id.; John Temple Lang, The Development of European Community Constitutional
Law, 25 INT'L LAw. 455 (1991).
21. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, pmbl. The preamble's conclusion is worded as
follows: "RESOLVED, by thus pooling their resources to preserve and strengthen
peace and liberty, and calling upon the other peoples of Europe who share their ideal
to join in their efforts, HAVE DECIDED to create a European Economic Community
.... Id.
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six founding members to preserve and to strengthen peace and
liberty. The preamble, therefore, embodies the Community's
ideal that Member States be so inextricably tied to each other
that war becomes "unthinkable. 22
Although political scientists and legal scholars differ in at-
tributing the original philosophical inspiration that led to the
foundation of the European Economic Community on pre-
cisely such principles,23 there is general agreement that the
EC's position as the soundest and longest-standing guarantor
of peace in Western Europe results from its being based on
"mutual interdependence between free and democratically or-
ganized polities."'2 4 As originally constituted under the EEC
Treaty in 1957, the EC comprised six Member States25 and
functioned by means of four Community institutions. 6 These
institutions remain unchanged today except for their size.27
Although the impetus for the Community's creation was polit-
ical,28 links between the Member States in the initial years of
the Community's existence were grounded primarily in an
ever-growing body of primary and secondary trade legislation.
Gradually, by virtue of the power vested in it to interpret both
the EEC Treaty and the actions of the Community institutions,
the European Court ofJustice (the "Court ofJustice"), in suc-
cessive rulings, defined and crystallized the nature of the inter-
relationship between Community law and the national laws of
the respective Member States, spelled out the nature of the
22. Id.; see Dennis Thompson, The Common Market: A New Legal Order, 41 WASH.
L. REV. 385 (1966) (stating that "[ilt was an attempt to contain the conflicts which
had ravaged Europe in the past and which would undoubtedly continue to chafe in
the future within a peaceful institutional system"); What A Community, ECONOMIST,
Nov. 2, 1991, at 13 (stating that "the EC's underlying ideal [is] that its members
should be so entwined that war between them would be unthinkable").
23. Some attribute the idea to Franklin Delano Roosevelt's concept of "one
world." See, e.g., Joachim Krause & Peter Schmidt, The Evolving New European Architec-
ture-Concepts, Problems, and Pitfalls, 13 WASH. Q. 79 (1990). Others credit 19th cen-
tury French writer Victor Hugo. AXEL KRAUSE, INSIDE THE NEW EUROPE 46 (1991).
24. Krause & Schmidt, supra note 23.
25. France, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Italy
were the original members of the EC.
26. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 4 (1). The Community institutions were
the Council, the Commission, the European Parliament, and the Court ofJustice. Id.
27. Consistent with the provisions of the EEC Treaty, the size and composition
of the institutions increased with each successive accession to the Community.
28. Sadurska, supra note 12, at 2502.
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Community's legal personality, 29 and delineated its exclusive
competence in external relations as provided for in Article 113
of the EEC Treaty. 0
B. Emergence of European Political Cooperation as the Logical
Corollary to the Formation of a Common Market
In furtherance of its Common Commercial Policy,3 ' the
EC, on behalf of the Member States, actively built up a wide
network of trade-based relations around the world. Various
forms of agreements were entered into: including "trade and
cooperation agreements," "association agreements," and a
wide variety of multilateral and bilateral treaties. Many of the
agreements were made between the EC and the same countries
which today are seeking full admittance to the EC.
The founders of the Community fully understood that the
EC's internal economic policies would, in time, inevitably pro-
duce significant external effects on its trading partners and its
geographically proximate neighbors and that such policies
could therefore never really be foreign-policy neutral.3 2' It was
not until a dozen years had elapsed from the EC's inception,
however, that the Member States formally articulated their ac-
knowledgment of this dynamic, having previously demon-
strated unwillingness to relinquish any further the exercise of
national sovereignty to the Community's institutions.33  In
1969, the Member States Somewhat cautiously agreed to an ex-
29. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 210. Article 210 of the EEC Treaty grants the
Community legal personality. Powers to conclude international agreements are con-
ferred on the Community either expressly or implicitly by the EEC Treaty. See EEC
Treaty, supra note 1, art. 210; see also Jacques H. J. Bourgeois, Effects of International
Agreements in European Community Law: Are the Dice Cast?, 82 MIcH. L. REv. 1250
(1984).
30. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 113. Traditionally, the Community has "no
legal powers in the spheres of foreign policy or defense." Temple Lang, supra note
20, at 463. Mr. Temple Lang also points out that "[t]he powers of the Community
over 'commercial policy' (that is, trade policy and a wide but so far imprecisely de-
fined area of other external economic relations) were declared to be exclusive by the
Court, not by the treaty itself." Id.
31. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 110-16. The Common Commercial Policy
laid down in Articles 110-116 of the EEC Treaty is based on the coordination of
Member States trade relations with third countries, resulting in a common policy
toward external trade. Id. art. I11.
32. See Note, A Community Within the Community: Prospects for Foreign Policy Integra-
tion in the European Community, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1066 (1990).
33. For example, France, in the mid-1960s under De Gaulle, insisted on a de
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periment in "European Political Cooperation" ("EPC") 34 the
evolution of which Was to be on a track separate and distinct
from the more commercially oriented provisions of the EEC
Treaty. 5 Encouraged by the initial results of EPC at the Paris
Summit of 1974, EC leaders agreed to create a European
Council.3 6 This was followed inJune 1982 by the Solemn Dec-
laration on European Union at Stuttgart that was intended to
strengthen and reinforce EPC.3 7 All the while, the Community
was attracting new members and steadily increasing in size.
C. The Single European Act-Codification of EPC and Expansion of
the European Parliament's Powers Concerning Association
and Accession
The early 1980s were characterized by a period of stagna-
tion as "[t]he sense of community was draining out of the Eu-
ropean Economic Community."' 38 A radical renewal of com-
munal purpose, however, evidenced itself in the mid-1980s fol-
lowing the issuance of the EC Commission's now-famous
White Paper.3 9 This set the stage for the Community's shift in
focus from a "common market" to a "single market." The
White Paper identified the specific intra-Community barriers
(fiscal, technical, and physical) that needed to be abolished on
an intra-Community basis and- proposed a timetable for this
purpose. Galvanized by the Commission's recommendations
and far-reaching vision, the Member States endowed that vi-
facto veto power over any Community action that a Member State would deem a
threat to its "vital interests." See generally Thompson, supra note 22, at 404.
34. Report by the Foreign Ministers of the Member States on the Problems of
Political Unification, 3 E.C. BULL., No. 11, at 9 (1970). The Member States subse-
quently agreed to codify the EPC in Title III of the Single European Act. See Single
European Act, supra note 3.
35. James Elles, The Foreign Policy Role of the European Parliament, 13 WASH. Q 69,
70 (1990). "EPC is the natural result of the recognition that the sharing of sover-
eignty entailed in economic integration must be accompanied by some degree of
political integration." Id.
36. Id.
37. See Hans-Joachim Glaesner, The Single European Act: An Attempt at an Ap-
praisal, 10 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 446, 447 (1987).
38. Flora Lewis, Alarm Bells in the West, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 551, 557 (America & the
World 1981).
39. AUDREY WINTER, ET AL., EUROPE WITHOUT FRONTIERS: A LAWYER'S GUIDE 4
[hereinafter WINTER] (citing Commission of the European Communities, Completing
the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the European Council,
COM (85) 310 (June 1985)).
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sion with the force of law, in the form of the Single European
Act, the first body of amendments to the EEC Treaty.40
As mentioned at the outset of this Article, all outward in-
dicia of "Europe 1992," that the world is witnessing today, are
the direct intentional results of the SEA's enactment and the
Community's institutions' systematic implementation of the
SEA's immutable timetable for achieving the single market.
Not surprisingly, following the Community's first formal steps
toward 1992, world-wide consternation arose that the Commu-
nity was engineering an impregnable "Fortress Europe."14,
Concerned about being excluded, several West European
countries made overtures to the EC: Turkey and Austria made
formal applications, Malta made inquiries. As far as the Com-
munity was concerned, no accession negotiations would be
considered or undertaken prior to 1993, pending completion
of the single market. 42
In addition to launching the 1992 program, and equally
important for purposes of the instant discussion, the SEA also
effectuated a number of modifications to the EEC Treaty that
are directly relevant not only to the recently concluded associa-
tion agreements between the EC and Poland, Hungary, and
Czechoslovakia, but also to the question of whether any of the
new associate countries will gain full EC membership in the
foreseeable future. First, Title III of the SEA in essence incor-
porated the processes of European Political Cooperation
("EPC") into the terms of the EEC Treaty itself.43 Inclusion
within the EEC Treaty did not render EPC legally binding per
se on the Member States; in contrast with the substantive pro-
visions of the EEC Treaty,44 the provisions of Title III were not
40. See Single European Act, supra note 3.
41. Robert M. Jarvis, American Business and the Single European Act: Scaling the Walls
of "Fortress Europe, " 20 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 227, 230 (1990).
42. Charles Grant, An Expanding Universe: Twelve or Twenty-Four, ECONOMIST, July
7, 1990, at 12.
43. See Single European Act, supra note 3, tit. III.
44. Glaesner, supra note 37, at 451. Mr. Glaesner noted that
[t]he adoption of Title III dealing with European political cooperation en-
tails no amendment to the Community Treaties. Title III is not subject to
that part of the procedure governed by Community law under Article 236.
Above all, Articles 3, 31, and 32 of the Single Act specify that Title III
should not be integrated into the Community legal order. The juxtaposi-
tion of the texts amending the Community Treaties and the texts on Euro-
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enforceable by the Court of Justice. 45 Title III indicated that
the various proposals for closer political union, which surfaced
with logical regularity, ultimately would be addressed. Subse-
quent, albeit gradual, movement toward monetary union com-
menced with the introduction of the European Monetary Sys-
tem in 1984.46 Not until the end of 1991 in Maastricht, the
Netherlands, was a landmark agreement reached on a new
Treaty on European Union (the "TEU")4 7 intended to facili-
tate the Community's increasing international responsibili-
ties. 48 The proposed TEU establishes the parameters for a
common foreign and security policy and introduces majority
voting in areas that now require unanimity.49 By the end of
this century, EC Member States would have a single currency,
the ECU, managed by an independent central bank, and a sin-
gle joint voice in international and world affairs.5" The TEU,
signed in February 1992, provides the framework for political
and monetary union, a common security and defense, and is to
become effective following ratification by the twelve Member
States. Denmark's recent rejection of the treaty by popular ref-
erendum51 casts some doubt on the future of the TEU in its
present version. Foreign ministers of the eleven other Mem-
ber States determined to press on with the ratification process;
on the national level, France and Germany similarly vowed to
pean political cooperation was a purely political act that led to the instru-
ment acquiring the name "Single Act."
Id.
45. See Note, supra note 32, at 1071.
46. The European Monetary System introduced the European Currency Unit
("ECU"), which is based on a "basket" of EC national currencies and is utilized for
all EC financial transactions. See WINTER, supra note 39, at 10.
47. Treaty on European Unity, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719 [hereinafter TEU], re-
printed in 31 I.L.M. 253 (1992).
48. Speech by Mr. Peter Schmidhuber to the CEPS (Center for European Policy Studies)-
Brussels, 4 February 1992: The Future Financing of Europe, RAPID, Feb. 4, 1992, available
in LEXIS, Europe Library, ALLEUR File; Paul Taylor, EC Heads Agree New Union
Treaty in Marathon Talks, Reuters, Dec. 11, 1991, available in, LEXIS, Nexis Library,
OMNI File.
49. Robert J. Wielaard, European Community Nations Sign Landmark Union Treaty,
AP, Feb. 7, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
50. Monetary union will be introduced as early as 1997, and at the latest in
1999, if at least seven Member States meet strict economic criteria. Taylor, supra
note 48.
51. Craig R. Whitney, Danes Reject European Union Treaty by Slim Margin, N.Y.
TiMEsJune 3, 1992, at A3. A second Danish referendum is to be held in late 1993.
The World This Week: Politics and Current Affairs, ECONOMIST, Jan. 30, 1993, at 4.
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continue without Denmark. 2 In fact, the lengthening queue of
prospective members that appear willing to accept the terms of
the TEU on its face that may enable the agreement to come
ultimately to fruition.53
The SEA significantly expanded the powers of the Euro-
pean Parliament in several of the Community's vital decision-
making processes. Inter alia, the SEA altered both the EEC
Treaty's erstwhile legal mechanisms governing the conclusion
of association agreements between the Community and third
countries and the "vetting" process under which otherwise
qualified non-member European countries could accede to the
EC. While falling far short of the increased legislative and
other powers sought by the European Parliament,54 the SEA
vested in the Parliament the power of co-decision with regard
to both any new agreements of association entered into by the
Community (under Article 238) and any future accessions to
the Community (under Article 237)." 5 These amendments, in
turn, were interpreted by the European Parliament as a man-
date to involve itself in the Community's foreign policy.5 6 As a
result, insofar as all current candidates for EC membership are
concerned, the rules governing the mechanics of accession are
untested but may prove to! be "of great political importance. 5
7
Consistent with the EC's continuing refusal to consider expan-
sion prior to 1993, more than six years have transpired since
the most recent expansion of the EC, the 1986 accession of
Portugal and Spain as the eleventh and twelfth members of the
EC.58 Future accessions will be pursuant to the amended EEC
52. Ian Davidson, France and Germany Back EC Expansion, FIN. TIMES, May 23,
1992, at 2; Mark Nelson, EC Ministers Plan to Press Ahead With Union Treaty, WALL ST.
J., June 5, 1992, at A7.
53. Julian M. Isherwood, Danes Reject European Integration Treaty, Could Face Eco-
nomic Isolation, UPI, June 2, 1992, available in, LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
54. See generally Elles, supra note 35.
55. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 237-38. Article 8 of the SEA amended Article
237 of the EEC Treaty to require the European Parliament's assent "by absolute
majority." Id.
56. See Elles, supra note 35.
57. Glaesner, supra note 37, at 465 (stating that "[i]t suffices to consider the
recurring discussion of Turkish accession to the Community. Parliament will cer-
tainly be called upon to participate in the conclusion of association agreements").
58. The first expansion of the Community was in 1973 when Denmark, Green-
land, Ireland, and the United Kingdom acceded. Greenland resigned its membership
in 1983 in a dispute over fishing policies.
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Treaty provisions.
D. The Road to the Europe Agreements via the Shifting Tectonic
Plates of Eastern Europe
By mid-1989, signals of burgeoning economic and polit-
ical reforms in Poland and Hungary were being received and
evaluated in the West. In Poland, the historic "Round Table
Talks" between representatives of the Solidarity movement
and the communist regime 59 were leading to the progressive
ouster of the latter as the former gradually assumed power and
announced plans for a market economy.6"
While it was clear that Hungary and Poland were success-
fully leading the way to political pluralism,6 ' the West had a
very real fear of an influx of tens of thousands of political refu-
gees, should law and order break down. The West's major
concern, that the nascent democracies should develop peace-
fully, 62 seemed best assured by an infusion of monetary aid.63
The traditions of the Marshall Plan were thus carried on by its
beneficiaries.
U.S. President George Bush visited Warsaw in early July
1989 and pledged American aid and credits.64 Following his
visit, he attended the "Paris Summit" of seven leading indus-
59. European Update. Doing Business in Poland, Eurupdate Database, 1991 WL
11687 (Nov. 6, 1992). "In 1989 the wretched state of the economy and growing
political pressure finally forced the communist government to begin talks with the
opposition." Id. at * 15.
60. Bronislaw Geremek, Postcommunism and Democracy in Poland, 13 WASH. Q. 125
(1990).
61. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Ending the Cold War, 12 WASH. Q. 27 (1989) [hereinafter
Z. Brzezinski].
62. Id.
63. Id. Mr. Brzezinski noted that
[w]ithout substantial Western aid, the process of change, notably in Hun-
gary and Poland and soon in Czechoslovakia, could simply provoke break-
downs, even revolutionary outbreaks, then repressive reactions and even be-
lated Soviet intervention. That would have terminal consequences for any
genuine democratization. Therefore, the West must unambiguously convey
that it holds the view that violent change in Eastern Europe would be
counterproductive from everyone's point of view.
Id.
64. U.S. aid outlined for Poland included a State US$100,000,000 Polish Ameri-
can Enterprise Fund; a pledge of support for Poland to obtain a US$325,000,000
World Bank Loan; and US$15,000,000 for environmental cleanup. Chronology 1989,
69 FOREIGN AFF. 213, 230 (Peter Hayes ed., America & the World 1989-1990)
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trialized nations6 5 where the nations determined that Western
aid should be funneled to Poland and Hungary to encourage
further reforms and to set an example for the remaining Soviet
satellites" contemplating similar reforms.66 Because "no one
could yet be sure that Moscow had not drawn a line beyond
which it would intervene, ' 67 such aid was initially limited in
size and scope. The Paris Summit participants assigned the EC
the responsibility for coordinating the Western aid programs.
In doing so, the Western nations set in motion one of the prin-
cipal aspects of the current convergence.
The need for coordination of the limited Western help
likely to be available became evident. It made sense to assign
the role to the EC Commission. Few realized then that this
would become the basis for a major political decision about
how to proceed with a profound reorganization of Europe.68
The EC Commission coordinated both the funds and the
technical support, as part and on behalf of a group that ex-
panded to include twenty-four industrial nations, 69 and it en-
gaged in substantial aid activities of its own.70 The Commis-
sion unmistakably wielded both "classic" foreign policy tools
and incentives, such as development aid, as well as "newer tac-
tics such as trade liberalization measures ... and debt relief"'7
to propel Eastern Europe toward further democratic change.
The cumulative effect of these wide-ranging measures paved
the way for Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia to enter into
the Europe Agreements that were concluded in December
1991.
65. The United States, Japan, Canada, Germany, France, Italy, and the United
Kingdom attended the Paris Summit.
66. Lewis, supra note 38.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Bruce Barnard, Czechoslovakia Hopes to be EC Member by 2000, J. COMM., Mar.
1991, at A3.
70. J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2405 (1991).
Professor Weiler commented on the EC's role:
Notice how naturally the Member States and their Western allies have
turned to the Community to take the lead role in assisting the development
and reconstruction of Eastern Europe. A mere decade or two ago, such an
overt foreign policy posture for the Community would have been bitterly
contested by its very own Member States.
Id.
71. Note, supra note 32, at 1077.
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Even more importantly, in effect anticipating the Commu-
nity's later accords in Maastricht, 72 the EC's international coor-
dination activities produced an entirely new phenomenon.
The allegedly separate spheres of European Political Coopera-
tion and issues heretofore exclusively within the competence
of the European Economic Community converged:
The need to co-ordinate economic and political strategies
for Eastern Europe has led to a blurring of the EC-EPC distinc-
tion. Normally the officials from national capitals who run
EPC would seldom meet the officials that countries keep in
Brussels to manage EC business. But over the past year the
two groups have met frequently to talk about Eastern Eu-
rope.
73
Certain commentators credit the EC Commission with this de-
velopment that the Commission subsequently maximized by
assuming the role of mediator between East and West, ulti-
mately strengthening its own position within the Community
power structure."
The EC's prominent role in promoting change in Eastern
Europe and its assumption of regional responsibility soon
placed it in the position of confronting the fact that, in the eyes
of the "Europeans" of the East, the EC had in effect arrogated
unto itself the connotation that "Europe" was synonymous
with the Community when, in fact, many newly emancipated
72. William Drozdiak, Differences Over Form of a United Europe Remain as Crucial Dec.
9 Summit Nears, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 1991, at A40. Mr. Drozdiak noted that
[a]s they confront the prospect of a European Community that could swell
to two dozen members or more in coming years, EC leaders realize that the
decisions at Maastricht will be the last chance to establish a basis to con-
struct a United States of Europe, or see the Community devolve into a dif-
fuse collection of states that form little more than a trading bloc.
Id.
73. An Expanding Universe; In Need of a Face-lift, EcONOMIST, July 7, 1990, at 30
(emphasis added).
74. Sadurska, supra note 12, at 2508-09 (stating that "[c]redit for this evolution
should go largely to the Commission, which, with the blessing of some national gov-
ernments, seized the opportunity to blur division lines between the Community's and
the European Political Cooperation's decision making in the policy and administra-
tion of assistance to Central and Eastern Europe"). Professor Weiler notes that
"[t]he European Commission now plays a central role in dictating the Community
agenda and in shaping the content of its policy and norms." Weiler, supra note 70, at
2406. Although it is too early to tell, perhaps the Danes' recently expressed distrust
of the huge EC bureaucracy is at least partly a result of the Commission having over-
played its hand?
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countries were now claiming entitlement to recognition as
members of Europe'.7 5  The Community increasingly was
pressed to address the fledgling democracies' expressed wish
for EC admission, or at least for some type of formalized part-
nership. Claims from East Europe arose-at a period in time
when the Community had consistently held off all applicants
on the ground that it would not consider expansion until after
the completion of its 1992 program. Moreover, under the
EEC Treaty, the EC's options were limited. Only two forms of
legal relationships with the EC have been utilized successfully
to date: full membership status and "associate status."' 76 As-
sociate status basically endows the associated country with free
trade benefits in certain defined areas.
In the latter part of 1991, the swift unraveling of the re-
maining communist regimes in the East, the dismantling of the
Council of Mutual Economic Assistance ("COMECON"),"'
and the evaporation of the Soviet Union gave rise to the pres-
ent, still-developing, reconfiguration of the European land-
scape in which the EC is. the pivotal institutional survivor of a
previously bi-polarized European continent. The seriatim dis-
integration of the Eastern European bloc as a unified economic
and political power heretofore centered around the once-for-
midable Soviet Union starkly contrasts with the EC's firm and
steady march toward full economic integration and its move-
ment toward political and monetary-union. This disintegration
placed the EC in a leadership position in the industrialized
world's efforts to deal with the rapid developments in Eastern
Europe. With no option but to reevaluate the future architec-
ture of Europe, industrialized nations focused on the Commu-
75. Sadurska, supra note 12, at 2502 ("[T]he... democratic revolutions of Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe brought to light the fallacy of viewing 'Europe' as limited to
the European Community .... The appropriation of the name was not geographi-
cally, historically, or culturally justified."); Weiler, supra note 70, at 2406 (stating that
"[iln public discourse, 'Europe' increasingly means the European Community in
much the same way that 'America' means the United States").
76. See infra notes 163-74 and accompanying text (discussing European Eco-
nomic Area).
77. Charter of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, Dec. 14, 1959, 368
U.N.T.S. 253 [hereinafter COMECON]. Also known as CMEA, COMECON was an
'economic and trade organization that included the U.S.S.R., Bulgaria, Czechoslova-
kia, the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Romania, Cuba, Mongolia, and Viet-
nam.
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nity.78 The Community, in turn, recognized that the progres-
sive strengthening of political cooperation not only facilitated
its shouldering of continent-wide responsibilities but also ren-
dered the EC's political and economic model increasingly at-
tractive to non-member countries in the process. 79 Commu-
nity leaders, "acutely aware of democracy's fragility" and its
own unsuccessful efforts at mediating a peaceful resolution to
the shooting war in Yugoslavia, became even more firmly con-
vinced that political union was desperately needed. 0
II. THE CASE OF POLAND
In negotiating the recent "Europe" Association Agree-
ments, the EC dealt separately, albeit in a closely parallel fash-
ion, with Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia,8 ' countries in
which "capitalist, free market traditions are rooted ' 8 2 and
which first initiated reforms. Consistent with the EEC Treaty's
legal framework, any future Community negotiations concern-
ing accession will be on an individual, country-by-country ba-
sis. The Community presumably chose to deal with Poland,
Hungary, and Czechoslovakia concurrently because these
three countries have, in the past several years, experienced
roughly similar economic and political travails while contem-
poraneously attempting to shake off the debris of some forty
years of ineffective Marxist-Leninist regimes. By the beginning
of this decade, all three had embraced the concept of free en-
terprise, created parliamentary institutions, and established
freedom of the press and religion.8 3 Each, however, is a dis-
crete nation, the product of centuries, and in the case of Po-
land, a millennium, of distinct political, cultural, religious, and
84
economic traditions. Poland's conversion to Christianity in
78. Jan Zielonka, East Central Europe: Democracy in Retreat, 14 WAsH. Q. 107
(1991); Krause & Schmidt, supra note 23.
79. See European Commission's Work Programme for 1990, Eur. Rep., Jan. 27, 1990,
available in LEXIS, Europe Library, ALLEUR File.
80. Malgorzata Bos-Karczewska, Building a New Europe, RZECZPOSPOLITA, No.
289, Dec. 12, 1991, at 3.
81. Commission Press Release, IP (91) 1033 (Dec. 23, 1990); see Europe Agree-
ments, supra note 10.
82. Adlai E. Stevenson & Alton Frye, Trading With the Communists, 68 FOREIGN
AFF. 53, 63 (Spring 1989).
83. Gati, supra note 4, at 130.
84. Id.
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966 A.D. marked the beginning of 1000 years of Polish associa-
tion with the West and its role as "the eastern outpost of West-
ern culture."85 Today's Poland is a uniquely homogeneous
country as compared to its neighbors; it is almost completely
ethnically, linguistically, and religiously uniform. 86
Poland was the first of the East Central European coun-
tries to reintroduce democracy and to stimulate a market-ori-
ented economy forcibly. "Shock policies" were introduced to
ensure the transition as the Polish government "applied a sur-
gical knife to the economy."' 87 This was the first attempt in
history at creating a market out of a mismanaged economy.
Unlike Spain and Portugal, which in the 1970s underwent radi-
cal political transformation, Poland did not have the benefit of
inheriting a weak private economy.88
Transition to a market economy from a socialist one is an
undertaking of vast proportions. Several principal characteris-
tics are recognized by the West as barometers of progress in
this direction. The first is "currency convertibility." This in-
volves making the national currency convertible into western
currencies so that commercial transactions can be handled in a
manner equivalent to that in the West. The second character-
istic requires eliminating government subsidies and allowing
prices to adjust rationally. Third, an appropriate legal frame-
work must be erected to ensure a sound banking and financial
system and free competition on the market. Fourth, inefficient
and uncompetitive state-owned factories and enterprises must
be privatized to stimulate growth and modernization. Priva-
tization, of course, calls for a significant influx of capital invest-
ment which, in a bankrupt economy such as Poland's, is nonex-
istent; hence, there is an urgent need for foreign capital infu-
sions and foreign investment. Western economists consider
that currency convertibility is well-advanced in Poland's re-
forming economy. 89 Other countries in the region are follow-
85. Wenceslaus J. Wagner, Introduction to POLISH LAW THROUGHOUT THE AGES:
1,000 YEARS OF LEGAL THOUGHT IN POLAND 2 (Wenceslaus J. Wagner ed., 1970)
[hereinafter POLISH LAW THROUGHOUT THE AGES].
86. See NORMAN DAVIS, HEART OF EUROPE: A SHORT HISTORY OF POLAND (1985).
This current homogeneity is due to the revamping of Poland's eastern and western
territorial borders after World War II. Id.
87. Gati, supra note 4, at 129-30.
88. Id.
89. See generally MERRITr, supra note 14.
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ing closely in the footsteps of Poland's "trail-blazing liberaliza-
tion of its foreign exchange,market."1'
The road Poland followed to the successful ouster of com-
munism lasted several decades and, in its early stages, pro-
voked violence and bloodshed.9 ' In its last phase, Poland's
transition was unique and consistently has served as a model
for other former Soviet satellite countries in the region. To-
day's Poland, a nation of 38,300,000 people 92 situated between
a recently reunified Germany and the even more recently re-
constituted states of Lithuania and Ukraine, expounds a clear
vision of its own future role in the new European architecture.
Political leaders of the new Poland have repeatedly articulated
their country's intent to become a full member of the Euro-
pean Community and to play a political role in the central por-
tion of Europe.93 While the exact means for attaining this am-
bitious vision are less than obvious, the West should keep in
mind that Poland is a country acutely aware of its centuries of
legal and democratic traditions and considers the present as
primarily a continuation of the past. Longtime political dissi-
dent and more recent Parliamentary figure Bronislaw Geremek
stresses that in view of Poland's "significant democratic tradi-
tion and a working knowledge of democratic institutions-as
well as a strong public preference for democracy," the political
transition is more a return to the country's preexisting demo-
cratic roots and is the very reason for its placement of the mar-
ket economy at the top of national priorities.9 4
90. Anthony Robinson, Poland Sets the Pattern-Eastern Europe's Move Towards Con-
vertible Currencies, FIN. TIMES, May 29, 1992, at 4.
91. See, e.g., JOHN MOODY & ROBERT BOYES, THE PRIEST AND THE POLICEMAN:
THE COURAGEOUS LIFE AND CRUEL MURDER OF FATHER JERZY POPIELUSZKO (1987).
Some examples of such bloodshed are the firing at workers protesting price hikes in
1970, the imposition of martial law on December 13, 1981, and the killing of Father
Popieluszko by the state's security apparatus. Id.
92. Poland, EASTERN EUROPEAN BUSINESS & INVESTMENT GUIDES, Sept. 24, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Europe Library, EEBIG File. Czechoslovakia has a population of
15,700,000 and Hungary has a population of 10,550,000. Id.
93. We Must Mobilize Forces Anew, PAPNews Wire, Dec. 21, 1991, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
94. Geremek, supra note 60,at 126. Mr. Geremek points out that this tradition
explains the abandonment by the communist regime, in 1956, of the forced collectiv-
ization of agricultural property in Poland and the ensuing private agricultural activity
there in the following three decades. Id.
Mr. Geremek explains that, in effectuating Poland's democratic revolution, its
leaders have followed a three-part strategy: 1) building a civil society (i.e., awakening
POLAND AND THE EC
The Poles' repeated insistence, as of early 1990, on even-
tual admission to the European Community represents a natu-
ral extension of the process of reclaiming their Western Euro-
pean heritage. Certain EC officials found this appeal not only
to be presumptuous, but it initially left Commission President
Jacques Delors "unmoved. ' 95 For all three Visegrad nations,
movement toward the EC is the very symbol of the termination
of the post-Yalta reality.96 The popular perception that eco-
nomic welfare exists in tandem with a stable democratic sys-
tem, as evidenced, inter alia, by Western Europe, the United
States, and Canada, is another factor.9 7 Firm evidence of the
EC's recognition of these countries' geographical and cultural
proximity to Western Europe is another aspect.98 Other forces
play a role as well, and are crucial to understanding the context
of the Europe Agreements.
A. Legal Framework of Poland's Pre-1990 Trade Relations with the
European Community
As formulated in December 1991, the Europe Agreement
entered into between Poland and the EC 99 is not solely the
product of newly articulated political objectives on either side;
the economic bases of the Europe Agreement are an out-
growth of the preexisting Trade and Cooperation Agreement
between Poland and the Community, 00 The phrase "Trade
and Cooperation Agreement" is a generic one in the context of
Community external relations. Since the 1960s, pursuant to
Article 113 of the EEC Treaty, the Community has entered
into many such accords on 'a worldwide basis with countries
such as Argentina and India. l0 ' These in turn gradually
the populace from the apathy and conformity of the totalitarian regime), 2) rejecting
violent revolution, and 3) pursuing a mixed economy. Id.
95. Grant, supra note 42.
96. Czechoslovakia-Hungary-Poland Sign Association Agreements with EC, BBC, Sum-
mary of World Broadcasts, Dec. 18, 1991, at EE/1258/Al/1, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, OMNI File.
97. Zielonka, supra note 78.
98. EEC/Eastern Europe: Commission Prepares Talks on Closer Cooperation, Eur. Rep.,
No. 1578, Apr. 12, 1990, at 8, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, ALLEUR File.
99. See Europe Agreements, supra note 10.
100. Council Decision No. 88/593, O.J. L 339/1 (1989) (conclusion of agree-
ment between EC and Polish People's Republic on trade, commercial, and economic
cooperation).
101. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 113. The Community has entered into trade
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evolved as a tool of the Community's foreign policy.' 0
It is essential to keep in mind that:one of the focal points
of the EC's commercial dealings with third countries has been
its Common Agricultural Policy ("CAP"), mandated by Article
3 of the EEC Treaty. 0 3 Other than laying down general prin-
ciples, the EEC Treaty itself says little about how to achieve the
policy. 0 4 The CAP therefore was constructed in the early
1960s °5 according to the particularized needs of several of the
EC's founding members, most notably France, which had a
sizeable agrarian sector in need of support. 0 6 Community
scholars point out that had Great Britain, for example, been
one of the founding members of the EC, the structure and pri-
orities of the CAP undoubtedly would have been vastly differ-
ent. 107 Thirty years later, the CAP has become the EC's most
expensive program. Because it retains many of its original bi-
ases, it has become a very major hurdle in the EC's trade rela-
tions under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT").08 While the current conventional wisdom is that
the GATT Uruguay Round may in the foreseeable future force
some changes to the CAP, historically the EC has conducted its
trade relations and resulting international agreements so as to
protect the CAP. At present, Community officials appear in-
agreements with Israel, Argentina, the ASEAN community, Bangladesh, Brazil, Can-
ada, China, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Romania, Sri
Lanka, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia.
102. The European Parliament, for example, has not been vested with any role
in connection with the conclusion of such agreements.
103. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 3. Article 40 of the EEC Treaty sets forth
how the Community is to establish a common agricultural policy. Id. art. 40. The
EEC Treaty also establishes the objectives of the common agricultural policy. Id. art.
39(1).
104. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 39. The EEC Treaty calls for a fair standard
of living for the agricultural community, that markets should be stabilized, and deliv-
ery of supplies should be guaranteed at reasonable prices. Id. As Mr. Thompson
noted in 1966 "this will be, of course, a paradise for all, not only for the farmers, but
also for the consumer." Thompson, supra note 22, at 396.
105. The first CAP-related regulations were enacted by the Council in January,
1962. Thompson, supra note 22, at 400.
106. Id. at 339 (stating that "[a]gricultural policy has always been of extreme
interest to the French, and for this reason the Community has made a great effort to
comply with French desires by pushing forward the agricultural policy as fast as pos-
" sible").
107. Dagtoglou, supra note 15, at 150.
108. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts. (5) &
(6), 55 U.N.T.S. 188 [hereinafter GATT].
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creasingly aware that the CAP cannot continue to take up more,
than one half of its budget when other vitally important sectors
such as the environment, energy, transport, and foreign policy
are relegated to sharing a fraction of that amount. 0 9
The genesis of the 1989 Trade and Cooperation Agree-
ment with Poland had its roots in the bipolarization of Europe
after 1946. Prior to World War II, Poland's international trade
was primarily with the discrete nations of Western Europe.
Following the war and the Yalta Accords, Poland became part
of the Soviet trading bloc and a party to highly asymmetrical
trading arrangements with the Soviet Union."1 0 Along with the
other satellite countries, Poland was a member of the Soviet-
sponsored COMECON,"I an organization created by the
U.S.S.R. as a counterweight to the EC.' 12 Relations between
COMECON and the EC were characterized by many years of
hostility during which each grouping refused to recognize the
other's legal capacity to enter into trade agreements on behalf
of its respective Member States, as the EC routinely did pursu-
ant to its expanding Common Commercial Policy.113
As a result of Mikhail Gorbachev's outreach activities to
the West, the EC in 1988 already was acting to broaden trade
and economic ties with the COMECON countries and to estab-
lish political ties as well.'" 4 Legal posturing ended in June
1988 when COMECON and the EC issued a Joint Declaration
establishing official trade relations and plans for economic co-
109. See Address by Mr. Ray Mac Sharry at the Sligo County Council Conference-4 and 5
May 1992, RAPID, May 4, 1992, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, ALLEUR File.
110. Kazimierz Grzybowski, The Councilfor Mutual Economic Assistance and the Euro-
pean Community, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 284 (1990).
111. COMECON, supra note 77 (associating the USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslova-
kia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania with Mongolia, Vietnam, and
Cuba).
112. Grzybowski, supra note 110.
113. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 113. As an exception to the general rule that
only the Community could execute international agreements in furtherance of its
Common Commercial Policy, the EEC Treaty initially allowed the Member States to
conclude bilateral trade treaties with Eastern European countries until 1973, when
this authorization expired.
Conversely, COMECON was not vested with legal treaty-making powers, and it
steadfastly refused to recognize that the Member States of the Community had in fact
surrendered their sovereign powers to the EC in this regard. Thus ensued 15 years
of lengthy negotiations between the EC on the one hand, and COMECON and each
of its Member States on the other hand. Grzybowski, supra note 110.
114. Grzybowski, supra note 110.
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operation in areas of common interest."15 Exactly three years
later, COMECON itself ceased to exist.". 6
Concurrent with its COMECON negotiations that ulti-
mately led to the Joint Declaration, the Community conducted
bilateral negotiations with several countries, including Hun-
gary and Poland, aimed at reaching trade agreements.'1 7 Sub-
stantial trading activity was ongoing with these two countries
as evidenced by the fact that in 1988 the EC was absorbing
nearly one third of Poland's exports." 8 In October 1989, a
Trade and Cooperation Agreement was concluded between
the EC and Poland;" 9 a similar agreement had been reached
with Hungary. 12 0  Typically such trade agreements are in-
tended to provide the signatory with additional access to EC
markets by eliminating certain quantitative restrictions and
quotas on exports to the EC. 12 1
Initially, the new association agreements, including the
1992 Europe Agreements between the EC and Poland, Czech-
oslovakia, and Hungary, 122 were proposed by the Community
primarily as "second generation" accords-a replacement for
and significant upgrade of the already existing "first genera-
115. 32 OJ. L 137 (1988); see Chronology 1989, supra note 64.
116. COMECON was dissolved in July 1991.
117.' The EC was also negotiating with East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria,
Romania, and the U.S.S.R. The agreements were generally similar and covered all
goods within the EC's competence. Thus the agreements did not include coal, which
was within the competence of the ECSC and was thus "for the Community, a neat
way of placing off-limits its special regime for steel and its protection against Polish
coal." JOHN PINDER, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND EASTERN EUROPE 26 (1991).
118. In 1988, the EC absorbed 23% of Hungary's exports, 24% of Czechoslova-
kia's, and a full 30% of Poland's exports. Eva Kaluzynska, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hun-
gary Sign Accords With EC, Reuter Lib. Rep., Dec. 16, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, OMNI File.
119. Council Decision No. 88/595, O.J. L 327/1 (1988) (concluding agreement
between EC and Hungarian People's Republic on trade and commercial economic
cooperation).
120. Council Decision No. 88/593 OJ. L 339/1 (1989) (concluding agreement
between EC and Polish People's Republic on trade, commercial, and economic coop-
eration).
121. PINDER, supra note 117, at 26-27. The agreement with Poland provided for
certain reductions of tariffs and levies on agricultural goods in return for certain re-
ciprocal tariff reductions. As with Czechoslovakia, specific quotas on textiles, steel,
and agricultural products were to end in 1994. Id. Because Hungary at that time had
achieved fewer political and economic reforms, the parallel agreement with Hungary
set the later date of 1995. Id. at 27.
122. See Europe Agreements, supra note 10.
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tion" trade and cooperation agreements.. While it is clear
that the very existence of the Europe Agreements is directly
attributable to the East Central European .countries' political
evolution along lines compatible with those of the Western de-
mocracies, much of the trade-related substance of the Europe
Agreement with Poland is a logical outgrowth of the 1989
Trade and Cooperation Agreement 2 4 in which barriers to
trade between the EC and Poland were first identified and ad-
dressed.
B. Legal Framework of EC Aid to Poland
In 1989, when Western nations first commenced pouring
foreign aid into East Central Europe, one of the Community's
many contributions was to accelerate the lifting of a variety of
quantitative restrictions on Polish exports to the 'Community
well ahead of the deadlines laid down in the 1989 Trade and
Cooperation Agreement with Poland. The EC Council acted
to liberalize trade further. 125  The Council extended to Po-
land, as well as to Czechoslovakia and Hungary, the schedule
of tariff cuts set forth in the EC's Generalized System of Prefer-
ences, normally offered to third world countries, and elimi-
nated or suspended quantitative restrictions on trade as ofJan-
uary, 1990 to all member countries except Portugal and
Spain.1 26 Textiles, steel, and coal were not covered by thequota suspension.127 Theimmediate effect of the EC's action
was to provide Poland with increased access to EC markets for
its farm produce. 128
The EC aid directed at Poland falls into both
"microeconomic" and "macroeconomic" categories.129
123. Kaluzynska, supra note 118; see supra notes 100, 120 and accompanying text
(citing "first generation" accords).
124. Kaluzynska, supra note 118.
125. See Council Regulation No. 3381/89, O.J. L 326/6 (1989) (liberalizing
quantitative restrictions with regard to Poland and Hungary); Council Regulation
No. 3692/89, O.J. L 362/1 (1989) (suspending quantitative restrictions in respect to
Poland and Hungary).
126. See Kaluzynska, supra note 118.
127. Id.
128. See MERRITr, supra note 14, at 40. Subsequently, the EC extended these
benefits to Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, and the Baltic States. EEC/Eastern Europe
Relations, RAPID, May 21, 1992 available in LEXIS, Europe Library, ALLEUR File.
129. MERRITT, supra note 14, at 72.
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Microeconomic aid has been dispensed primarily within the
parameters of the PHARE program' 3°0-one of the principal
mechanisms devised by the Community to evidence support
for Polish and Hungarian economic restructuring."13
"Macroeconomic" assistance has generally taken the form of
funds donated by the G-24 under terms and conditions dic-
tated by the International Monetary Fund (the "IMF") and the
World Bank.
1. Microeconomic Aid: The PHARE Program
The PHARE program targeted five principal areas of ac-
tivity: restructuring the agricultural sector, increasing access
to Western markets, promoting investment, protecting the en-
vironment, and increasing professional training opportuni-
ties. 132 "All Community PHARE funding is in the form of non-
reimbursable grants to the beneficiary governments."'' 3 3 To
date, some twenty-seven projects have been approved for Po-
land at a cost of ECU380,000,000; their principal focus has
been economic restructuring, the development of small firms,
and human resources.' 34 The EC Commission administers
and monitors PHARE to ensure that efforts under PHARE par-
allel other Western aid efforts.' 35 The list of beneficiaries of
PHARE has expanded to include the CSFR, Bulgaria,
Romania, the Baltic States, and Yugoslavia (currently blocked)
130. PHARE in the English language connotes "beacon of light." The acronym
itself is French and stems from Pologne, Hongrie: aide d la restructuration economique. See
id. at 73.
131. See Council Regulation No. 1360/90, O.J. L 131/1 (1990) establishing a
European Training Foundation to provide job training, and where appropriate, re-
training for young people and adults. Id. The PHARE program had certain eligibil-
ity criteria that at that time could only be met by Poland and Hungary. Professor
Sadurska lists these requirements as commitment to the rule of law and human
rights, free multi-party elections, and economic activity geared to a free market.
Sadurska, supra note 12, at 2504 n. 12. Subsequently, PHARE was extended to Bulga-
ria, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia. Id.
132. Council Regulation No. 1360/90, O.J. L 131/1 (1990).
133. EEC/Eastern Europe Relations, supra note 128, at 2.
134. Id. Economic restructuring under these programs targets the environ-
ment, agriculture, industrial, financial, social, and health sectors.
135. A committee on aid for economic restructuring in Poland and Hungary was
established at the Commission pursuant to Council Regulation No. 3906, OJ. L 375
(1989). When dealing with aid questions involving the European Investment Bank, a
representative of the latter is to participate in such proceedings. See infra notes 147-
49 and accompanying text (discussing the European Investment Bank).
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with a 1992 budget of ECU1,700,000,000.36
2. Macroeconomic Aid
The first major "macroeconomic" aid was in the form of
the 1990 Polish Stabilization Fund of US$1,000,000,000. This
aid played a critical role in launching the Polish Government's
economic "shock policies" by making Polish currency, the
zloty, convertible for all domestic transactions. 3 7
Another major initiative to promote democratic, multi-
party principles and market economics in East Central Europe
was the creation of a London-based European Bank for Recon-
struction and Development (the "EBRD") by the EC and forty
countries. 138 Its stated purpose is "foster[ing] the transition
toward open market-oriented economies and to promote pri-
vate and entrepreneurial initiative" in East and Central
Europe.'39 The choice of a banking mechanism was based
upon the founding countries' hope that use of governmental
monies to promote investment in the private sector of the new
democracies, and in particular the requirement that at least
sixty percent of the annual total of the EBRD's loans be made
to private borrowers, would eventually induce private capital
to follow suit.' 40 Article 8 of the agreement establishing the
EBRD sets out eligibility criteria for recipient countries.14 ' Re-
cipients must be "proceeding steadily in the transition toward
market oriented economies."'' 42 Membership in the EBRD is
open to European countries, the EC, non-European members
of the IMF, and the European Investment Bank (the "EIB").143
Working in cooperation with the IMF, the World Bank, the Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and Development (the
136. EEC/Eastern Europe Relations, supra note 128.
137. MERRITT, supra note 14, at 72. See text accompanying notes 87-89 (discuss-
ing Poland's "shock policy" and current convertibility).
138. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development: Agreement Establishing, 29
I.L.M. 1077 (1990) [hereinafter Bank Agreement]. Initial capital was set at
ECU10,000,000,000 and initial subscriptions to the authorized stock were allocated
among prospective members. Id. at 1078. For example, the EC's allotment was
22,800 shares at ECU228,000,000; the U.S., 100,000 shares at ECU1,000,000,000;
France and Germany, 85,175 shares each at ECU851,750,000. Id. at 1102-03.
139. Id. at 1084.
140. PINDER, supra note 117, at 87.
141. Bank Agreement, supra note 138, at 1086-87.
142. Id. at 1086.
143. Id. at 1078.
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"OECD"), and other organizations, the EBRD's functions in-
clude mobilizing capital and management, as well as providing
technical assistance in promoting private investment and priva-
tization. 144 Most recently, the EBRD. has expanded its activi-
ties to include pledging funds to assist Poland's privatization
program, rebuilding the regional trade that collapsed with
COMECON, and assisting fledgling banking sectors in identi-
fying and avoiding international money laundering schemes. 45
The EBRD has for the first time brought in commercial banks
as participants on a US$60,000,000 loan to Polska Telefonia
Komorkowa, a joint venture between Western and Polish
firms. The loan has been syndicated to four European banks
who have been granted "preferred creditor status," and it re-
flects EBRD's strategy of financing joint ventures having West-
ern European partners to stimulate increased investment. 146
The EIB, a separate legal entity created pursuant to Arti-
cle 3 of the EEC Treaty, 47 serves as the Community's banking
"arm." Although its primary function is to provide grants and
loans for intra-Community regional development and indus-
trial modernization, its authority to issue loans to non-Member
States has involved it extensively with countries with which the
Community has association agreements. The EIB's interplay
with the PHARE program'has involved the promotion of pri-
vate investment and financial assistance to small firms. The
Council granted the EIB a guarantee "against losses for loans
for projects in Poland and Hungary."' 48 The EIB's investment
activities currently extend to Poland, Hungary, Czechoslova-
kia, Romania, and Bulgaria, with a total of ECU1,700,000,000
earmarked for loans to these five countries.' 49
144. Id. art. 2; see infra notes 390-412 and accompanying text (discussing priva-
tization). In June 1991, the Bank announced its first investment loan of
US$50,000,000 to a Polish bank in Poznan. MERRITr, supra note 14, at 132.
145. Attali Opens New EBRD Offices in Warsaw and Budapest; ECU Loan Set, EBRD
WATCH, Mar. 16, 1992, at 3, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, EERPT File.
146. Sara Webb, EBRD Brings Banks Into East European Lending, FIN. TIMES, May
11, 1992, at 17.
. 147. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 3. Subparagraph (j) calls for "the establish-
ment of a European Investment Bank to facilitate the economic expansion of the
Community by opening up fresh resources." Id.
148. Council Directive No. 90/62, O.J. L 42 (1990).
149. EEC/Eastern Europe Relations, supra note 128.
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III. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EUROPE AGREEMENTS
IN THE LARGER CONTEXT OF POLAND'S
ASPIRATIONS TO EC MEMBERSHIP
A. The Legal Framework of the Community's Association Agreements
in General
The Europe Agreements (which Poland, Czechoslovakia,
and Hungary are counting on to pave the way to full Commu-
nity membership) constitute a form of "association" agree-
ment specifically contemplated in Article 238 of the EEC
Treaty. 5 ' Association agreements have long formed a stan-
dard part of the EC's panoply of international networking with
its geographically proximate neighbors in the Mediterranean
Basin and Western Europe. For example, association agree-
ments have been concluded with Cyprus, Malta, and Turkey,
(all EC hopefuls),' as well as with non-European countries
which, by definition, are not eligible for membership.15 2 Virtu-
ally identical association agreements with each of the Euro-
pean Free Trade Association ("EFTA") countries 5 3 have been
in place since the early 1970s., 54
150. Article 238 of the EEC Treaty provides as follows:
The Community may conclude with a third State, a union of States or an
international organization agreements establishing an association involving
reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special procedures.
These agreements shall be concluded by 'the Council, acting unanimously
after receiving the assent of the European Parliament which shall act by an
absolute majority of its component members. Where such agreements call
for amendments to this Treaty, these amendments shall first be adopted in
accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 236.
EEC Treaty, supra note '1, art. 238. As noted above, the second paragraph is as re-
placed by Article 9 of the Single European Act. See Single.Euiopean Act, supra note
3.
151. See infra notes 263-321 and accompanying text (discussing other EC
hopefuls).
152. Association agreements exist with Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan,
Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Turkey, Switzerland, Sweden, Austria, Norway, and
Finland. Israel recently indicated itwished to extend its ties to the EC yet further by
becoming a member of the European Economic Area. Hugh Carnegy, Tension Marks
Israel's Talks with Community, FIN. TIMES, May 12, 1992, at 2.
153. EFTA is the acronym for the European Free Trade Association founded in
1960. Its original members were Great Britain, Denmark, Austria, Finland, Iceland,
Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland. Subsequently, Great Britain and Den-
mark, and more recently Portugal, left the ranks of EFTA to join the EC.
154. The EC concluded association agreements with the current members of
EFTA as follows: Austria in 1972, Finland in 1973, Iceland in 1972, Norway in 1973,
Sweden in 1972, and Switzerland in 1972.
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B. An Overview of the Community's Prior Association Agreements
Although the central objectives common to all association
agreements are the creation of free trade for defined products
between the individual country and the EC15 5 and the provi-
sion of varying degrees of access to EC markets for defined
agricultural products, the "political" scope of the association
agreements varies widely. The association agreements of the
1960s with Cyprus and Malta were each crafted with the far-
reaching goal of a progressive "customs union" with the EC,
while the agreement with Turkey goes further, expressly refer-
ring to prospects of future EC membership.1 56 The association
agreements with countries with whom individual EC Member
States have had close historical or political ties (for example,
France with Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon, and Syria;
and Britain with Cyprus, Egypt, and Malta) provide industrial
and technical cooperation as well as financial assistance. 157
Pursuing a policy of "enlightened self-interest," the Commu-
nity's long-standing role in fostering economic and political
stability in the region, labeled "the EC's global Mediterranean
policy," has assumed even greater urgency, in the Commis-
sion's view, in the wake of the 1991 Gulf War. 58 The EC is
committed to maintaining the traditional flow of agricultural
goods from its Mediterranean associates, irrespective of the ac-
cession of Spain and Portugal, whose agricultural output
otherwise would be in direct competition therewith.1
59
By far the most extensive network of agreements exists
with some sixty-nine African, Caribbean, and Pacific ("ACP")
countries under a series of "Lome Conventions." 160 Although
technically cast in the form of association agreements, Lome is
actually a mechanism under which the EC operates the "largest
155. Every association agreement establishes unlimited duty-free access for in-
dustrial products originating in the associate country. EC COMMISSION, EUROPE:
WORLD PARTNER 27 (1991) [hereinafter EC COMMISSION].
156. Grant, supra note 42, at 7. Reciprocal concessions to the EC are provided
for in the agreements with Turkey, Malta, Israel, and Cyprus. EC COMMISSION, supra
note 155.
157. EC COMMISSION, supra note 155. Financial aid takes the form of direct
grants and loans from the European Investment Bank.
158. Id. at 27.
159. Id. at 28.
160. See I. K. Minta, The Lome Convention and the New International Economic Order,
27 How. L.J. 953 (1984).
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single aid program in the world."'' The fourth Lome Con-
vention runs from 1990 to 2000 and provides for
ECU 12,000,000,000 of aid to the ACP countries in the form of
grants, "soft" loans, and interest-rate subsidies.
Elements common to past association agreements in
which the Community is the economically dominant partner
are (1) the Community's willingness to liberalize trade on the
EC side more rapidly than on the associates' side and (2) a
firmly stated commitment to specified quantities of financial
aid over a stated time period.'
62
C. The European Economic Area 161
An important step beyond the basic concept of the associ-
ation agreement, and illustrative of the Commission's trend to-
ward ever more innovative thinking, is the Community's re-
cently announced agreement with the seven EFTA nations that
would provide for the creation of a European Economic Area
(the "EEA") throughout nineteen states. The EEA, scheduled
to come into being this year following three years of arduous
negotiations, would comprise a vast trading bloc of
380,000,000 consumers, accounting for nearly forty-five per-
cent of world trade, t 64 wherein goods, services, capital, and
people would flow freely across international frontiers. Regu-
latory and legislative cohesion within the EEA will be ensured
by the application, on the part of the EFTA members, of some
1500 Community rules in fields such as finance, competition,
environment, social policy, and consumer protection. 65 The
1000-page EEA agreement excludes agriculture "mainly be-
cause Norway, Finland, and Switzerland would not expose
161. EC COMMISSION, supra note 155, at 28.
162. PINDER, supra note 117, at 70. Currently, the Community has offered ex-
tensive financial protocols for the time period 1991-1996 to most of its Mediterra-
nean associates. Id.
163. The Agreement is in the draft stage only. See Dr. Gerhard Wegen,
Transnational Financial Services-Current Challenges for an Integrated Europe, 60 FOROHAM L.
REV. S91, S101 (1991). It will take effect if ratified by the parliaments of all countries
involved. See Norway Seeks Delay in EC Decision on Petroleum Directive, FIN. TIMES, July
29, 1992.
164. EFTA, E.C. Sign Accord for Giant Single Market, Agence France Presse, May 2,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
165. See Sarah Lambert, Europe's Trade Deal Heartens ECApplicants, INDEPENDENT,
Oct. 23, 1991, at 10.
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their farmers to competition."'' 66 The affluent EFTA states
have also agreed to contribute heavily to the EC's coffers for
the subsidization of the less wealthy Member States (Greece,
Ireland, Portugal, and parts of Spain) in the form of
ECU500,000,000 over the next five years, and will also make
low-interest development loans to these countries totalling
ECU 1,500,000,000 (US$2,730,000,000). 167
It is clear that the impetus that gave rise to the original
concept and eventual outcome of an EEA is of vital concern to
countries such as Poland whose placement in the queue of
countries hoping for full EC membership will be affected by
any perception on the part of the Community that participa-
tion in an EEA-type arrangement is the next logical step after
association and thus a newly-devised de facto condition prece-
dent to accession. Analysts generally agree that the idea of an
EEA was concocted by the Community primarily to stave off
what it foresaw as the EFTA countries' inevitable bid for EC
membership. 168 In particular, although the concept underly-
ing the EEA was first advanced in 1985, the specific idea of an
EEA as such is viewed as Commission President Jacques
Delors' brainchild of early 1989, when the EC started feeling
pressure from would-be members 169 such as Austria.
Certain Polish analysts, notwithstanding Community dis-
claimers to the contrary, promptly interpreted the announce-
ment of an EEA as yet another obstacle that would operate to
delay further EC membership. Poland's concern with the EEA
is based on the awareness that the "brainchild" conceivably
could undergo future rebirths in the form of parallel mecha-
nisms to stall the Eastern European countries. At one point in
September 1990, the EC hinted that Poland, Czechoslovakia,
and Hungary should set their sights on eventual participation
in the EEA, rather than on EC membership. 170 Polish officials
are not tempted by allusions of EC officials such as Frans An-
166. Graham Brown, EC, EFTA Countries Prepare for World's Biggest Single Market,
Agence France Presse, Apr. 30, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
The three Nordic countries "are close to having the world's most protected farm
sectors." Id.
167. Id.
168. See Brown supra note 166; Grant, supra note 42, at 1.2; Lambert, supra note
165, at 10.
169. Grant, supra note 42; Lambert, supra note 165.
170. MERRITr, supra note 14, at 40.
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driessen to the possible creation of a new "affiliate" status' 7 1
or Francois Mitterand's repeated suggestions of a European
"confederation" in lieu of expansion. 172 Commentators noted
from the outset that an EEA represents only a stopgap mea-
sure. The EFTA members of an EEA will not only be com-
pelled to apply EC regulatory standards and legislation that
they have had no input in formulating, but they will also con-
tinue to be precluded from participation in drafting and adopt-
ing future EC legislation that will impact upon them. Also, be-
cause an EEA will be a free trade zone rather than a customs
union, its members will continue to handle external commer-
cial relations with third countries. Current commentators de-
scribe an EEA as an antechamber or "a kind of half-member-
ship of the Community."' 173 It is acknowledged that the EEA is
a transitional phase preceding EC membership, 74 a descrip-
tion that is increasingly apt as ever greater numbers of the
EFTA states move toward EC membership.
D. Genesis of the Europe Agreement with Poland
As ultimately concluded in December 1991, the Europe
Agreements represent a clear triumph from the perspective of
the three East Central European signatories on the issue of
eventual EC membership. The final agreements go further
than originally intended by the EC Commission, insofar as they
concretely recognize the possibility of eventual full acces-
171. See Andriessen Proposes Affiliated Membership to Pave Way for New European Rela-
tionships, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 624 (Apr. 24, 1991).
172. Steven P. Kramer, The French Question, 14 WASH. Q 83 (1991). "Mitter-
and's idea of a European confederation has always been murky and has irritated the
United States, which it excluded; the Germans, who thought it diverted attention
from more important forums ... and the East Europeans themselves .... who fear
that it could be construed as an alternative to EC membership." Id.; see Roger Boyes,
Freedom Fighters Choose New Chains, TIMES, Dec. 19, 1991.
Another prominent Frenchman, Jacques Attali, President of the EBRD, is cur-
rently advocating an agreement between the EC, EFTA, Eastern Europe and the Eu-
ropean Far East, similar to the North American Free Trade Agreement. The opinion
of this author is that Poland might be less than enthusiastic about being in the "Mexi-
can" position of Mr. Attali's analogy.
173. David Buchan, Court Gives Go-Ahead to EC-EFTA Accord, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 13,
1992, at 3; David Buchan, EEA Treaty to Spur Hot Debate on Bigger EC, FIN. TIMES, May
2, 1992, at 2.
174. See Peter Ludlow, The Maastrict Treaty and the Future of Europe, 15 WASH. Q
119 (1992).
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sion."75 The preamble to each of the Europe Agreements
makes specific reference to the ultimate goal of membership of
the respective new associates. 176
A retrospective glance at the principal points of the grad-
ual evolution of the Commission's and especially President
Delors' stance toward inclusion of an express reference to po-
tential membership highlights the unique convergence of his-
toric, economic, legal, and political trends discussed at the out-
set of this Article. It also illustrates the initial conflict between,
and subsequent convergence of, major Community objectives
as the EC struggled to respond to the ever greater tremors in
the East. In some small measure, it may indicate how Poland's
future efforts to gain admittance will unfold.
Along the route to the successful conclusion of the Europe
Agreements, the EC grappled with complex factors stemming
from its Common Commercial Policy,177 Common Agricultural
Policy,' 78 European Political Cooperation, 79 increased focus
on the roles of the European Parliament and the European
Council, environmental concerns, security, and defense con-
siderations-the list is far from exhaustive. These "associa-
tion" agreements, arguably the most recent and far-reaching
ever concluded by the EC, reflect the dynamic propelling the
Community today.
The road to association was undertaken in late 1989 when
the European Council, 80 meeting in Strasbourg, announced
the Community's intent to create an "association" with those
Central and Eastern European countries engaged in economic
and political reform. 8' This action was an obvious corollary
to and extension of the EC Commission's foreign aid activities,
175. "Just a year ago the situation ... was totally different: Membership of the
three countries was taboo and treated as an illusion." Bos-Karczewska, supra note 80.
176. Andriessen Says EC Searching for New Approach to Former Soviet Republics, 9 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 112 (Jan. 15, 1992); see Europe Agreements, supra note 10.
177. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 113.
178. Id. art. 40.
179. See Report by the Foreign Ministers of the Member States on the Problems
of Political Unification, 4 E.C. BULL., No. 11, at 9 (1970).
180. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text (discussing European Council
and European Political Cooperation).
181. Eastern Europe, Eur. Rep., No. 1560, Feb. 3, 1990, at 11, available in LEXIS,
Europe Library, ALLEUR File. It was understood that the European Council would
provide a much broader range of cooperation than the existing trade and coopera-
tion agreements. Id.
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that by then had been ongoing for a number of months. As
with existing association agreements, it was envisaged that a
free trade zone gradually would be created wherein there
would be free flow of goods, persons, services, and capital. In
mid-January 1990, the European Parliament, briefed by Frans
Andriessen on the situation and the speed of change in Eastern
Europe, approved a joint resolution expressing its support for
the democratization process in Poland and its support of fur-
ther Community aid.'8 2 Weeks later, the EC Council voted in
favor of the Commission's proposal on the association agree-
ments. 18 3 The stated policy of the Community, however, was
that the issue of eventual EC membership "will not be ex-
cluded, but it will not be included."'8 4 Sensing the Commu-
nity's recalcitrance on this critical issue, Poland announced its
unequivocal intent to pursue the membership path.' In ret-
rospect, it is evident that, of the Community institutions, the
EC Commission especially perceived the association agree-
ments as yet another incentive to East Central Europe for con-
tinued economic and political reforms. To that end, although
the EEC Treaty on its face imposes no legal requirement that a
prospective associate have in place a democratic form of gov-
ernment as a prerequisite to the conclusion of an association
agreement, EC Commission representatives made it clear to
the three countries in March 1990 that a "fully democratic
structure" in each constituted an absolute sine qua non of the
anticipated association agreements. 1 6
Prior to submitting an outline of the proposed agreements
for the Council of Ministers' approval in April, the Commis-
sion again reaffirmed its position that the stated objectives of
the agreements would not expressly include the objective of
182. See id.
183. See Europe Agreements, supra note 10. The Commission opened an official
delegation to Warsaw in September 1990.
184. EEC/Eastern Europe. No Membership But More Cooperation, Eur. Rep., No.
1570, Mar. 10, 1990 (statement of Frans Andriessen at March 6, 1990 press confer-
ence), available in LEXIS, Europe Library, ALLEUR File.
185. Club de Bruxelles: Commission Announces EEC/Czechoslovakia Cooperation Agree-
ment Initialled; Poland to Seek EEC Membership, Eur. Rep., No. 1574, Mar. 24, 1990, at 9,
available in LEXIS, Europe Library, ALLEUR File.
186. Id. (statement of Pablo Benavides, Director of East European Affairs of the
Commission).
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eventual accession. 187 The Commission continued to maintain
that, as a matter of law, an express provision would be super-
fluous since Article 238 of the EEC Treaty applies to any dem-
ocratic European country.' 88 Unstated was the Community's
view that association is a goal sufficient unto itself.
In accordance with the EEC Treaty's provisions, the
Council adopted directives in mid-December 1990 authorizing
the Commission to commence negotiations with Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. 89 Prior to the end of that year,
"formal" negotiating sessions commenced on a separate basis
with each of the three prospective associates.' 90 "Informal"
discussions had commenced earlier on a Polish draft agree-
ment submitted to Brussels in June 1990 that Polish experts
prepared after studying the EC's agreements with Turkey,
Greece, and Portugal.' 9 ' Once negotiations were under way,
Poland repeatedly called for a "political protocol" to be at-
tached to the final agreement that specifically referred to Po-
land's eventual accession; the Commission continued to re-
sist.'9 2 Similar pressure was exerted by the Czechs and the
Hungarians. 93 Addressing the issue in Prague in March 1991,
Frans Andriessen spoke only in terms of providing under-
standing and support, inferring that the link being forged with
187. EEC/Eastern Europe: Commission Prepares Talks on Closer Cooperation, Eur.
Rep., No. 1578, Apr. 12, 1990, at 8, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, ALLEUR
File.
188. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 238. Observers were skeptical of the
stated rationale: "[I]n reality the commission does not want the East Europeans to
think of membership as an option for the foreseeable future." Grant, supra note 42,
at 12.
189. The projected outline for the agreements had been developed in Septem-
ber 1990. See Sadurska, supra note 12, at 2505.
190. On December 20, 21, and 22, 1990, discussions commenced with Czecho-
slovakia, Hungary, and Poland, respectively. Commission Press Release, IP (91)
1033 (Dec. 23, 1990).
191. Miroslaw Glogowski, Poland-EC: Behind the Negotiations, WARSAW VOICE,
Nov. 24, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File. Mr. Glogowski notes,
however, that by and large there was a dearth of knowledge about the Community:
"[T]he Polish Ministry of Agriculture . . . like several other [ [institutions] initially
lacked a single employee familiar with EC matters." Id.
192. Barnard, supra note 69.
193. The three prospectiv)e associates repeatedly cited the prior association
agreement between the Community and Greece that had referred to eventual Greek
accession in both the preamble and in a substantive provision, and the existing asso-
ciation agreement with Turkey that also makes two such references. PINDER, supra
note 117, at 71.
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the three countries would be limited to the creation of a free
trade zone between the associate countries and the EC. 1 94
Hungary's Prime Minister continued to advocate the East Cen-
tral Europeans' entitlement to membership prior to the end of
the century. 195
Nine monthly sessions between the Community and each
country were held until agreement was reached by the already
extended deadline of November 1991. The sessions with Po-
land were substantively difficult, especially concerning the is-
sue of future Polish agricultural, steel, coal, and textile exports
to the EC, in view of the Community's own long-standing diffi-
culties in those areas. The products that Poland is most capa-
ble of exporting, farm produce, coal, steel, and textiles, are
precisely those that the Community needs least. 196 The issue
of agricultural exports resurfaced with increasingly less pros-
pect of resolution. One outside expert, retained by the EC
Commission to report to it on Eastern European issues, aptly
noted that "the EC is profoundly schizophrenic in its attitude.
It is pouring money and technical expertise into Eastern Eu-
rope to help raise farmers' yields, and at the same time it
guards it own markets against cheaper produce from the
East." " 9 7
Briefly stated, the circular nature of the problem is as fol-
lows. Countries such as Poland are in dire need of capital to
purchase modern equipment and technology from the West
for use in virtually every economic sector. Increasing Poland's
access to the EC's markets for relatively cheap Polish farm pro-
duce is unquestionably the quickest and easiest way to gener-
ate cash. Yet during the association discussions, EC negotia-
tors specifically excluded agricultural produce, along with steel
and textiles, from the Community's early offers of tariff cuts.
To the Polish people, such a posture reeked of protectionism.
194. See Association Agreement with EC to be Signed by End of 1991, CTK National
News Wire, Mar. 9, 1991, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, ALLEUR File.
195. Eva Kaluzynska, Former Communist Countries Line Up to Woo European Commu-
nity, Reuter Bus. Rep., June 11, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
Hungary's President Jozsef Antall stated that "it should be our turn in 1997 or
1998." Id.
196. Id.; Anne Wagner-Findeisen, With Strings Attached-An Analysis of Ex-
emptions Granted Under Article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty (1990) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with LL.M Program Director, Fordham University School of Law).
197. MERRIrr, supra note 14, at 153.
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Another observer noted that at "the same time that Jacques
Delors was talking of bringing the East into the protective
compound of Western Europe, Polish negotiators were chisel-
ling out an agreement on quotas for Polish mushrooms." '98
On several occasions, the negotiations verged on the brink
of failure as the Polish delegation perceived a lack of sufficient
good faith effort on its counterparts' side.' 99 One of the major
stumbling blocks was the resounding rejection by France, Ire-
land, and Belgium of Frans Andriessen's proposal for three an-
nual twenty percent cuts in tariffs on agricultural goods from
Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia.20 ° Seeking to protect
French farmers, France in early September 1991 blocked pro-
gress on the agreement by refusing to grant access to Eastern
European meat products.2 0 ' Spain and Portugal expressed
concern about increased access for textiles and steel.20 2 EC
negotiators were compelled to seek a mandate from the Coun-
198. Roger Boyes, Snails trailing in Polish race for Western markets, TIMES, Dec. 17,
1991. Mr. Boyes further stresses that "Poland, potentially, is one of biggest agricul-
tural exporters in Europe. So far ... only a trickle has entered the EC. Even under
the new [association] agreement, there will only be a staggered increase. The agri-
cultural balance of the EC could shift radically after Poland's accession." Id. Thus,
notes Mr. Boyes, the GATT Uruguay Round's impact, if any, on modifications to the
CAP "are becoming crucial to the relationship between Eastern and Western Eu-
rope." Id.
Whether the EC negotiators' protectionist stance can be attributed primarily to
the 1992 single market program is unclear. Dire predictions of such protectionism
have abounded among legal scholars. See, e.g., Jarvis, supra note 41, at 230 (stating
that "the coming of the internal market heralds the closing of Europe to outside
parties and the beginning of an era of new and unprecedented protectionism on the
part of the members of the EC").
199. In July, "[t]he EC's resistance on liberalizing trade led to a situation where
the agreement became questionable. The Polish delegation began to seriously con-
sider leaving Brussels .... Things could have taken an unpredictable turn, had it not
been for the failed communist coup in Moscow." Glogowski, supra note 191. How-
ever, stalemates continued to surface into the fall months. "Once again the Polish
delegation lamented the lack of commitment made by the Community and urged the
Commission to take a final step further in an attempt to consolidate the conclusion of
the accords by the already extended deadline of mid-November." EEC/Poland:
Tough Turf Still to Cover in Association Talks, Eur. Rep., No. 1715, Oct. 26, 1991, at 1,
available in LEXIS, Europe Library, ALLEUR File. "Warsaw has learned this big les-
son of free market international dealings: the political support of Western statesmen
does not necessarily translate into favorable trade treatment." International Reports,
IBC USA, Nov. 15, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
200. Highlights, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1309 (Sept. 11, 1991).
201. Alan Riding, The Soviet Transition; The New Europe.- Will it Look East, or In-
ward, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1991, at A12.
202. Row Between EC and Central European troika, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1991.
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cil providing additional negotiating flexibility and announced
that they would be making a new offer to the Poles.2 °3
In the interim, the Community reluctantly agreed to Po-
land's request for a mention of future EC membership, but
only via a carefully worded reference to eventual accession in
the preambles to the agreements. 20 4 Czechoslovakia and Hun-
gary extended this concession their agreements as well. 20 5 The
EC team negotiating with Czechoslovakia then reached agree-
ment on the exact language.20 6 The agreements referred to
and reflected the associates' hopes for future accession and the
Community's view that "association should help them to attain
this objective. '20 7 Significantly, however, the preambles do not
specifiy any time frame.20 8 Polish officials continue to stress
that only when cast in the light of eventual accession can the
association agreements promote the country's long-term eco-
nomic stability. 20 9
E. Scope and Breadth of the Agreement with Poland
1. General Provisions Common to Each of the
Europe Agreements
Sufficient agreement finally was reached to permit the in-
dividual "initialling" in Brussels on December 16, 1991 of the
three proposed association accords. The parties relegated a
number of contentious trade-related issues to be dealt with in
separate "protocols," as they have been with prior EC associa-
tion agreements. 210 Because Article 238 of the EEC Treaty re-
quires that all association agreements be ratified by each of the
203. Britain claims to have "pressed successfully for generous trade liberalisa-
tion" in the Europe Agreements. Douglas Hurd, Trade and the Perils of Protectionism,
SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, Feb. 23, 1992, at 22.
204. Sadurska, supra note 12, at 2505. The Community was attempting to "keep
Central Europe at a safe distance."
205. "The three countries interested in associating with the EC kept each other
informed .... The applicants took advantage of each other's successes in negotiat-
ing individual parts of the agreement .... the Hungarians and Czecho-Slovaks used
the Poles' success in introducing an entry about future full membership in the EC."
Glogowski, supra note 191.
206. Commission Press Release, IP (91) 788 (Aug. 2, 1991).
207. Id.
208. Commission Press Release, IP (91) 1033 (Dec. 23, 1990).
209. EC Initials New Free Trade Accords with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, 8 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1720 (Nov. 27, 1991).
210. The EC-Swiss Trade Agreement for example, has five such protocols at-
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associate countries, 21 ' by the parliaments of each of the Mem-
ber States, and by the European Parliament before the agree-
ments can be officially concluded, the Europe Agreements also
include "interim agreements." The Community may enter
into these interim agreements as part of its own power to con-
duct external relations under EEC Treaty Article 113212 to
avoid the lengthy delays inherent in the ratification process.
Such interim agreements were to ensure that the majority of
the trade-related portions of the Europe Agreements could be-
come effective as of March 1992,21 long before the ratification
formalities could be completed. The parties to the interim
agreement to which Poland is a signatory are the EC and the
European Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC"), on the one
hand, and the Republic of Poland on the other.2 1 4 The interim
agreement's legal effectiveness is based on its being a continu-
ation of the 1989 Trade and Cooperation Agreement between
Poland and the EC, and on a trade protocol entered into be-
tween the ECSC2 5 and Poland in October 1991.216 Originally
intended to expire at the end of 1992, the interim agreements
have been extended at the Community's request because the
Member States have been unable to complete individual ratifi-
cations within the allotted time frame.21 7
tached dealing with areas such as rules of origin, certain agricultural products, and
tariff treatment for specified products.
211. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 238. In Poland, the parliamentary body is
known as the Seym; it consists of 460 deputies elected for a four-year term and is the
"lower house" counterpart of the Senate which consists of 100 senators. The mem-
bers of the Seym, along with the President and the Council of Ministers, have the
right to initiate new legislation.
212. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 113.
213. See Europe Agreements, supra note 10. The interim agreements went into
force as scheduled. Council Regulation No. 521/92, OJ. L 56 (1992).
214. George L. Bustin et al., EC Association Agreements: Time to Renegotiate?, XI
INT'L FIN. L. REv. 26 (Oct. 1992) [hereinafter Bustin].
215. The ECSC has been actively involved in contributing to the restructuring
of Central and East European coal and steel industry by way of trade and cooperation
agreements and loans of ECU200,000,000 earmarked for this purpose. EEC/Eastern
Europe Relations, supra note 128.
216. Id.; O.J. L 105 (1991). Designated industrial and agricultural products
from Poland will thus benefit promptly from the overall terms and conditions of the
Europe Agreements.
217. Ratification at the present time is being further delayed by the Member
States' preoccupation with the fate of the TEU. Some Polish officials are expressing
concern about possibly deliberate delay of ratification of the agreement with Poland
by those countries experiencing complications with their exports (for example cars)
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For the first time the Europe Agreements include a cul-
tural dimension and, far more importantly, a political dimen-
sion 218 that "introduces and institutionalizes regular meetings
at the highest political level on all topics of common interest
and is aimed at achieving convergence in the parties' positions
on foreign policy matters. '2 '9 Thus, in a major turnabout on
the EC's part, the stage has been set for foreign policy and
cultural exchange between the Community and the three coun-
tries, which will likely allow for the latter to attend, as observ-
ers, future "summits" of EC heads of state and government.220
The Europe Agreements were initialled in mid-December
1991. By then, Jacques Delors, whose objetfixe of political and
monetary union appeared to be coming to fruition at the Maas-
tricht summit, was markedly enthusiastic about the breadth of
the Europe Agreements, differentiating them from "any ordi-
nary association accords."' 22 ' He stated that "the association
•.. marks the reconciliation of Europe with itself. It is a funda-
mental change of direction. ' 22 2 Czechoslovakia's Vaclav Havel
characterized the Europe Agreements as "possibl[y] the single
most important agreement in our post war-history. It is a con-
tract that specifically opens the door for us to the political and
economic life of democratic Europe. '223
to Poland. Poland-EC Treaty Blocked, GAZETA WYBORCZA, Oct. 24-25, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
The European Parliament's ratification of the association agreement with Poland
took place on September 16, 1992. European Parliament Approves Poland-EC Association
Agreement, PAP News Wire, Sept. 16, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI
File.
218. Czechoslovakia-Hungary-Poland Sign Association Agreements with EC, supra note
96.
219. Commission Press Release, IP (91) 1033 (Dec. 23, 1990).
220. The first meeting of the EC's ministers of Foreign Affairs with their
Visegrad counterparts was held in early October 1992, and although no specific com-
mitment was made on the Community's part to improve access to its markets, the EC
leaders agreed that a "package of specific and balanced measures to improve market
access" would be presented before year's end. Development of EC Relations with Poland,
Hungary and Czechoslovakia, Reuter Textline, Oct. 8, 1992, available in LEXIS, Europe
Library, ALLEUR File.
221. Europe Enters New Era With Association Accords, Eur. Rep., No. 1730, Dec. 17,
1991, at 1, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, ALLEUR File.
222. Eastern Europe: Trade Accords Seen as Step Toward Full EC Membership, 3 EXTER-
NAL IMPACT EUR. UNIFICATION, No. 19, Jan. 13, 1992, available in LEXIS, Europe Li-
brary, EURWCH File.
223. President Diagnoses Ills and Reviews Successes in New Year Speech, BBC, Summary
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2. Trade Provisions Common to the Europe Agreements-
Free Movement of Goods, Services, and Workers
The three agreements have identical structures and pro-
vide for the standard "association council. ' 22 4 Although the
agreements are technically of indefinite duration, the trade re-
lated provisions revolve around a concretely defined series of
objectives that are scheduled to transpire over a ten year pe-
riod; this period is further subdivided into two five-year
phases.22 5 Overall, they establish preferential treatment of the
associates by progressively abolishing mutual barriers to trade
and by gradually introducing a free trade zone during the lat-
ter portion of the ten-year period. Products such as textiles
and steel, which are covered by special protocols, will be dis-
mantled at a slower rate than the overall industrial tariffs. 6
Separate protocols will also deal with rules on origin, customs
cooperation, and "safeguard" clauses.227
As may be expected, the agreements will not vest in Poles,
Czechs, or Hungarians any rights of "establishment" in the EC
or "free movement of persons" within the meaning of the EEC
Treaty; however, nationals of the associate countries already
established in the Community will benefit from improved
treatment. At the end of the transitional period, as defined in
the agreements, "national treatment" will be afforded to firms
and professions wishing to establish themselves in a Member
State. Free movement of capital, repatriation of invested capi-
tal and of gains thereon, investment operations, etc. are also
guaranteed. A lengthy list of fields for enhanced economic co-
operation, in which the parties have a mutual interest ranging
from cooperation in precluding international money launder-
of World Broadcasts, Jan. 3, 1992, at EE/1268/B/I, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, OMNI File.
224. See Europe Agreements, supra note 10; EEC/Eastern Europe Relations, supra
note 128. The association agreement with Turkey provides for a similar Association
Council. The council is to meet at least annually, and is to ensure proper implemen-
tation of the agreements. Also established in the Europe Agreements is an associa-
tion parliamentary committee, which has an advisory role.
225. Id. The 10-year phase in will take place in two five-year stages. EC Initials
New Free Trade Accords with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, supra note 209.
226. Id.; Anthony Robinson, Survey of Poland, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1992, at 4.
227. Safeguard clauses would permit a reversal of certain EC free trade obliga-
tions if Polish exports become too successful in EC markets. EC Initials New Free Trade
Accords with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, supra note 209.
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228ing schemes to training and education programs, is aimed at
enabling the newly associated countries to continue the re-
structuring of their economies and to become competitive by
the end of the transitional period.
The greatest impact on the new associates will arise from
the agreements' requirement of "progressive approximation of
legislation" in each of the three countries, including the spe-
cific proviso that Community competition rules be adapted
into the national legal systems. 229 The Community's insistence
on parallel regulation of competition is in tandem with the
EEA agreements. In Poland's case, this is to be effectuated
over a three-year period.23 0 In regard to regulation of compe-
tition on Polish territory, Poland, at the time of the negotia-
tions, already had in place relatively strong anti-monopoly leg-
islation.231 The Polish negotiators suggested a radical innova-
tion whereby, as soon as EC competition law is fully
incorporated into Polish law, Polish undertakings would have
direct recourse to the EC Commission under Article 85 of the
EEC Treaty as is enjoyed by EC undertakings.23 2 In other
words, if a French and a German company engaged in conduct
violative of Article 85 on Polish territory, then not only would
228. EEC/Eastern Europe Relations, supra note 128. The defined sectors of eco-
nomic cooperation include the following: industrial cooperation, investment promo-
tion and protection, product standards, scientific and technological cooperation,
training and education, cooperation on social affairs, regional development, small
and medium size enterprises, statistical cooperation, money laundering, drug traffick-
ing, environment, transport, telecommunications, etc. Id.
229. PINDER, supra note 117, at 65. On the issue of the association agreements'
anticipated requirement for approximation of the associates' internal laws, British
scholar John Pinder opined in mid-1991 that it is not "seemly for the Community to
insist that eastern countries abandon price controls and a system of import levies and
export subsidies which have insulated their industries from international market
forces, while at the same time insisting that it retain just such a system for its own
agriculture." Id.; see Interim Agreements with the EC, FIN. TIMES, June 1992, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
230. EC rules on state aid to enterprises are also to be introduced, but not until
the expiration of a five-year period, in view of Poland's current economic situation.
EC rules on intellectual property are to be progressively approximated over a five-
year period as of March 1, 1992. EC public procurement practices are to be put into
immediate effect. Trade Treaty with EEC-Timetable, RZECZPOSPOLITA, No. 264, Nov. 15,
1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
231. Competition Rather Than Tariff: Interview with Anna Fornalczyk, Head of Anti-
Monopoly Office, RZECZPOSPOLITA, No. 289, Dec. 12, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, OMNI File [hereinafter Fornalczyk].
232. Id.; see EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85.
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they be liable under Polish law, but the case could be referred
to the Court ofJustice. 3 3 Such a provision was of vital impor-
tance to the Poles who, while actively seeking to attract foreign
investment, wanted to ensure that foreign companies would
not carve the market into monopolies or oligopolies with im-
punity. The EC responded that the inclusion of such a provi-
sion within the context of an association agreement would cre-
ate too much of a precedent; however, the parties included a
provision that spelled out Poland's right to seek this condition
from the Association Council upon its establishment.234
3. Trade Provisions in the Agreement with Poland
A separate trade liberalization calendar was established
with each country over the next ten-year period. The time
frames agreed to with Poland generally provide duty-free ac-
cess to the EC for about fifty-five percent of Polish goods in the
first year, gradually increasing to 100% by 1999.235 In areas
where customs duties remain in force for some time, they will
233. Fornalczyk, supra note 231; see EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85.
234. Fornalczyk, supra note 231; see EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85. In addi-
tion to the EC's unwillingness to establish a precedent, the Poles discerned what they
consider ulterior motives for the EC's refusal such as the reluctance to impose more
work on Commission staff and, more importantly, a "gold-rush" mentality:
[T]here is strong pressure from the Western business community for
not "civilising" countries in our part of Europe too fast. It is not unusual at
all for Western businessmen coming here to treat us either as utterly igno-
rant or as people who, even if they possess some knowledge, are incapable
of making use of it; furthermore, there is a belief that this disorderly envi-
ronment provides good opportunities for some not-quite above-board busi-
ness deals .... Often our interlocutors were surprised to find out we were
acquainted with economic theories, or that we had a legal system.
Fornalczyk, supra note 231.
235. Liberalization schedule after implementation of agreement:
first year - 70% of P goods will be duty-free
1993 - 71%
1994 - 73%
1995 - 76%
1997 - 77%
1997 - 85%
1998 - 100%
Schedule of specific goods and products affected:
Second year: 25 mineral products and chemical raw materials will be exempted from
duty.
January 1996: five non-ferrous metals will be fully liberalized.
January 1997: elimination of customs duties for iron and steel products and a large
group of so-called mutual trade sensitive products such as cements, a series of chemi-
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be reduced gradually.236
Shortly after initialling the agreement, Poland's chief
negotiator with the EC, Andrzej Olechowski, indicated that Po-
land's exports of industrial goods and agricultural produce to
the EC will increase almost immediately. He projected that the
1990 figure of ECU5,000,000,000 worth of industrial goods
exported will grow by fifteen to twenty percent a year, while
farm exports will increase by between ECU100,000,000
and ECU200,000,000 over the 1990 amount of
ECU5,000,000,000. 237
The overall thrust of the agreement with Poland, as with
many prior association agreements, is "asymmetrical." Po-
land was allotted the lion's share of the trade concessions dur-
ing the first five-year phase. Not until 1995 will Poland com-
mence lifting its own customs duties on imports from the EC,
and then at a rate of only twenty percent during the second five
year phase. The signatory parties anticipated that the cost of
EC exports to Poland would be exceeded by the cost of Polish
exports to the EC by at least several hundred million dol-
lars.2 38 EC Members, on the other hand, are to gain new mar-
kets and obtain preferential trading status from Poland for
their exports, as well as less quantifiable benefits resulting
from the proposed political dialogue. 239 As a practical matter,
however, the asymmetry currently exists in reverse: the trade
balance has been shifting to the Community's advantage since
1991 when the Community doubled its exports to Poland.24 °
cal products, casein, tires, leather and leather products, shoes, glass and porcelain
products, radio and televisions, lamps, cars, and certain types of furniture.
January 1, 1998-liberalization of remaining goods-assuming that structure of ex-
ports does not change. Commission Press Release, IP (91) 1033 (Dec. 23, 1990).
236. Assuming the 1991 figure to be 100, the average customs duty on Polish
industrial goods will be about 23% of that figure in 1992, 20% in 1993, 14% in 1994,
nine percent in 1995, 5.5% in 1996, two percent in 1997, and zero percent in 1998.
237. Poland-EC Agreement: Rewards of a New Market, WARSAW VoIcE, Dec. 22,
1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File. In farm produce the widest ex-
port opportunities are in pigs, hogs etc. for which the EC increased the limit by about
ECU30,000,000 a year and in apples and apple products, also raised by
ECU30,000,000 a year. In industrial goods, in descending order, greatest benefits
will be felt by textiles, shoes, chemicals, glass, and porcelain industries. Id.
238. EC Initials New Free Trade Accords with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, supra
note 209.
239. Id.
240. EEC/Eastern Europe Relations, supra note 128.
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The immediate beneficiary of the Europe Agreement has been
the Community, as technologically superior exports from the
EC have quickly taken advantage of freer trade.2 4 ' The protec-
tionist stance of the EC on agricultural products is being
viewed with alarm by OECD officials, who stress that, unless
the West provides the markets for East European exports, eco-
nomic recovery in countries such as Poland will be seriously
jeopardized.242 Mr. Olechowski, however, appears to be opti-
mistic that further liberalization concessions will be made by
the Community within five years.243 Prime Minister Suchoka
currently stresses that further trade liberalization measures
cannot be deferred.244
Significantly, and in stark contrast with many of the EC's
existing association agreements, none of the Europe Agree-
ments was accompanied by a firm commitment of financial aid.
On the contrary, in Poland's case the EC took the position that
Poland should address itself to the IMF, the World Bank, the
G-24, commercial banks, and lastly, Brussels.245 The agree-
ment merely "foresees" financial aid under the PHARE pro-
gram through 1992, and under a new or similar framework
thereafter, along with loans from the European Investment
241. By the Community's own reckoning, "(diuring the first nine months of
1991, our imports from Poland further grew by 25%, while our exports doubled. As
a result, the trade balance turned into the favour of the Community." Id. Commu-
nity exports to Central and Eastern Europe rose by some 30% in 1991. EC Trade with
East Rising Rapidly, Eur. Rep., Oct. 24, 1992, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, AL-
LEUR File. Manufactured products accounted for 81% of this figure. Id. Imports
from those countries rose by 21.4%. Id.
242. David Marsh, The European Market: Central Europe Surveys an Imperfect Pact,
FIN. TIMES, May 11, 1992, at 4; see Jolanta Zombrit, Poland's Entry into EC: Advantages
and Costs, GAZETA BANKOWA, No. 24, June 14-20, 1992, reprinted in POLISH NEWS
BULL., June 19, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
Translated into hard economic facts, the prospect of Poland's entry into the
EC no longer arouses the enthusiasm it used to incite two or three years
ago. In fact, the integration with the EC and the costs inherent in it have
become a divisive issue within the Polish community of economists and poli-
ticians . . . . A report on this subject was prepared by the Office of the
Government's Plenipotentiary for European Integration and Foreign Aid.
Id. at 1.
243. Sem Concerned Over Agriculture Provisions in Polish-EC Treaty, PAP News Wire,
May 27, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
244. News Highlights, PAP News Wire, Oct. 29, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, OMNI File.
245. Alina Bialkowska, In Stages Toward Free Trade, GAZETA WYBORCZA, Nov. 13,
1991, at 5. "Poland is not happy with this proposal." Id.
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Bank. Although this vague commitment obviously did not stop
Poland from proceeding with the agreement, its full signifi-
cance, or lack thereof, is now coming to the fore as Poland re-
alizes that the heretofore steady and unconditional Western
funding has slowed to a trickle and that the changes it has un-
dertaken to make are a costly proposition.24 6
4. The Europe Agreement as the Critical Path for
Polish Accession
While the numerous legal, fiscal, and economic measures
that Poland has committed itself to adopt as a result of its asso-
ciation agreement will be implemented primarily in compli-
ance with that agreement, it is clear that each and every such
measure will be implemented with a view toward the time pe-
riod beyond the ten-year phase envisaged in the association ac-
cords. 2 47 Poland's prime motive is, quite simply, its unwaver-
ing objective of full EC membership at the end of ten years, if
not sooner. 48 The vast commitment to a comprehensive regu-
latory revamping that Poland hasundertaken would make little
sense to Poles absent any prospect of EC membership.249
Officials outside the Community and observers in general
have been critical of the Community's apparently superficial
commitment to prompt integration of the new associates. Jac-
ques Attali, President of the EBRD, has repeatedly condemned
the European Agreements for focusing on restricting the asso-
ciates' access to key western markets rather than on integrating
them.250 Journalist Richard Davy points to two major "black
246. Id.
247. Maciej Urbaniak, Biala ksiega, GAZETA BANKOWA, Jan. 2, 1991, at 4. Polish
Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka emphasizes that full EC membership is Poland's un-
changing goal and the Communities are an anchor of Polish political and economic
stability. News Highlights, supra note 244.
248. Urbaniak, supra note 247.
249. Id.
250. Eastern Vision, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1992, at 18. A team of lawyers with the
firm of Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton offers the following observations:
Controversy has heated up over the EC's agreements of association ....
Jacques Attali, President of the [EBRD], told a European Community con-
ference in early September that the Association Agreements should be rene-
gotiated "on better and more open terms, treating [the Associates]-and
any other countries willing and able to join-as future equal members of an
economic community rather than competitors to be kept out." . . . EC com-
panies initially will be the primary beneficiaries of the Association Agree-
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holes" undermining the value of the Europe Agreements as
originally concluded, the first being the Community's luke-
warm handling of the prospective membership question, and
the second being "the timorous and hypocritical way it shields
itself from Central European imports. With self-defeating ab-
surdity, it helps these countries to modernise and then shuts
out the goods they must sell if they are to earn their way out of
trouble."25 ' In other words, the economic pain that the associ-
ate countries must undergo in order to attain minimum eco-
nomic eligibility for eventual membership is in fact exacer-
bated by the EC's own protectionism.252
IV. CANDIDATES FOR ACCESSION AND LEGAL
FRAMEWORK OF NEGOTIATIONS
A. Neutrality and NA TO-Problematic Issues Related to the Pending
. and Anticipated Applications from EFTA Countries
Article 237 of the EEC Treaty lays down the requirements
253 itfor the accession of any European state. Since its inception
in 1958, the EC has undergone several expansions, each of
which has served to demonstrate that "even the accession of a
free and democratic European country is not without consider-
able difficulties. ' 254 Thus despite the EEC Treaty's "openness
in principle," the Community has invariably proven reluctant
ments. This is because in large measure the Association State industries
cannot currently compete well in manufacturing and service areas where
they may lack the equipment and the experience.
Bustin,'supra note 214.
251. Richard Davy, You Can Have Our Aid, But Don't Ask for Trade, INDEPENDENT,
May 26, 1992, at 21.
252. Broaden the Market, TIMES,Jan. 5, 1993; Western Europe's Economic Night is Key
to Stability in the East, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 12, 1993, at 19.
253. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 237.
Any European State may apply to become a member of the Community. It
shall address its application to the Council, which shall act unanimously af-
ter consulting the Commission and after receiving the assent of the Euro-
pean Parliament which shall act by an absolute majority of its component
members.
The conditions of admission and the adjustments to this Treaty necessi-
tated thereby shall be the subject of an agreement between the Member
States and the applicant State. This agreement shall be submitted for ratifi-
cation by all the Contracting States in accordance with their respective con-
stitutional requirements.
Id.
254. Dagtoglou, supra note 15, at 150.
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to consider new members.2 55
In practice, when an application for membership is re-
ceived by the Council, it requests the Commission to prepare a
report on the application. This process alone can take several
years. After the Commission's report is submitted and re-
viewed, the Council decides whether to authorize the com-
mencement of formal negotiations. Accession negotiations,
once they actually commence, are apt to last several years.256
If the terms of a treaty of accession are agreed upon, the twelve
national parliaments of the respective Member States as well as
the European Parliament must ratify them.257
As of this writing, seven countries have formal member-
ship applications pending: Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Malta,
Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey. The Community to which
these countries may ultimately accede will undoubtedly be a
different entity than the one to which they originally applied.
The Community's steady movement toward social, political,
and monetary union, in addition to economic integration, en-
sures a significant transformation.
East Germany, of course, did not technically "accede" to
the EC; it was legally "absorbed" by the Federal Republic of
Germany. Former East German law initially remains in effect
only to the extent it does not violate Federal Republic or Euro-
pean Community law.258 Although eighteen additional seats
were added to the European Parliament to reflect reunified
Germany's larger population,259 Germany might insist on yet
more seats, thus raising the prospect of increased voting
weight vested in the Member State that is already the largest
contributor to the EC budget. The political impact of a reuni-
fied Germany on future enlargements of the Community
should not be underestimated. The increased size of Germany
produced a school of thought within the Community that the
best way to offset increased German power is by expanding the
255. See id.
256. For example, although Portugal and Spain applied for membership in mid-
1977, their actual accession did not take place until nearly 10 years later. Id. at 156.
257. Elles, supra note 35; Looking Eastward, ECONOMIST, July 8, 1989, at 38.
258. Werner F. Ebke, Legal Implications of Germany's Reunification, 24 INT'L LAW.
1130 (1990).
259. William Drozdiak, Differences Over Form of a United Europe Remain as Crucial
Dec. 9 Summit Nears, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 1991, at A-40.
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Community's membership.2 60 France supports active Commu-
nity involvement in the economic development of Central Eu-
rope as the "only way to counterbalance German economic
dominance ' 26' in that region. France, however, seems equally
intent on maintaining the Western European orientation of the
EC's membership in the foreseeable future and thus favors the
prompt accession of the EFTA countries. 62
It is increasingly clear that, notwithstanding the order in
which applications have been or will be submitted to the Coun-
cil, certain candidates, notably the EFTA countries, are on a
much faster track to membership than other applicants.263
Each is a relatively affluent democratic country with many ex-
isting legal, historical, cultural, and commercial links with the
EC Member States. Irrespective of the EEA, additional EFTA
countries such as Norway are expected to apply for full mem-
bership. Austria submitted its application in 1989,264 Sweden
applied in 1990, Finland in early 1992,265 and Switzerland in
mid-1992. Although the accession of these candidates may
take place as early as 1995,266 uncertainties as to the TEU may
produce delays.267 While there is certainly disagreement
within the ranks of the twelve EC Member States concerning
the desirability of prompt positive reaction to Austrian, Swed-
ish, and Swiss overtures, 26 8 any such difference of opinion
260. Krause & Schmidt, supra note 23.
261. Kramer, supra note 172.
262. Id.
263. See, e.g. ,Janet McEvoy, EC Unlikely to Give Pledges on Eastern European Member-
ship, Reuter Libr. Rep., Oct. 26, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
Mr. Andriessen, for example, has stated that he foresees two successive waves of ex-
pansion: the EFTA countries first, followed by Cyprus, Turkey, Malta, and the three
Central European associates. Bos-Karczewska, supra note 80. France and Germany
are urging that accession negotiations with the EFTA applicants be undertaken "as
soon as possible." Ian Davidson, France and Germany Back EC Expansion, FIN. TIMES,
May 23, 1992, at 2.
264. 1991 International Reports, IBC USA, July 26, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, OMNI File.
265. Finnish Prime Minister in Portugal to Present EC Application, BBC, Summary of
World Broadcasts, Mar. 20, 1992, at EE1334/i, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
OMNI File.
266. See Tom Redburn & Charles Goldsmith, EC Still Stumbles on Word: Federal,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 4, 1991.
267. McEvoy, supra note 263.
268. "EC officials are not so sure about a rapid timetable for Sweden. 'Sweden
may be trying to rush things too much,' an official said. 'There is too much confusion
POLAND AND THE EC
pales in comparison to the far more divisive question of mem-
bership for the fledgling democracies of East Central Eu-
rope. 269
Historically, the Scandinavian countries, for whom mem-
bership was not even on the agenda until "they began to feel
the chill" of the 1992 Single Market program, have demon-
strated what has been described as a "smorgasbord" approach
to EC membership. 270 Greenland officially acceded to the
Community in 1973 but later withdrew due to the EC's fishing
policies. 27' Norway also refused to join on account of these
same fishing policies.272 The major bone of contention over
the nordic countries' joining the EC has been their insistence
on political "neutrality" in the international arena, and they
have been loathe to give ground on a position which has
formed the central tenet of their foreign policy for decades.
Norway, particularly intent on maintaining its neutrality, in
1972 decided against pursuing membership after a national
referendum.273 Switzerland's neutrality, of course, predates
World War II and was respected even by Adolf Hitler.
The enactment of the SEA and its express incorporation
of political cooperation and reference to a common European
defense position strengthened the EC Commission's long-
standing position that neutrality is inconsistent with the EC
membership. Throughout his tenure, President Delors has
and uncertainty right now about where things go from here.' " Tom Redburn, Swe-
den's Bildt: Full Tilt Toward the EC, INT'L HERALD TRiB., Oct. 27, 1992, at 37.
269. Lewis, supra note 38. However, some Member States such as Italy and Ger-
many have been articulating support for the three new associates to become full
members before the turn of the century. Suchocka Visits Pope and Italian Premier in
Rome, PAP News Wire, Oct. 24, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
The Italian Premier assured the Polish Premier that "the Italian Parliaments [sic]
delay in ratifying the treaty for associate membership . . .was simply a procedural
matter." Id.; see Rolf Soderlind, Genscher Wants Early EC Membership for East Europeans,
Reuter Libr. Rep., Mar. 21, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
Sweden, an EFTA country whose membership application to the EC is pending,
has expressed strong support for bringing Central and Eastern European countries
into the Community. Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt recently described this issue
as one of the neglected topics on the European agenda. Redburn, supra note 268.
270. Iceland simply opted to drop out from the EC because it felt that continued
membership would adversely affect its major national industry, fishing. See Tony
Thomas, The Nordic Alternative: Part-time Europeans, ECONOMIST, Nov. 21, 1987, at 18.
271. Jarvis, supra note 41, at 227 n.2.
272. Id.
273. Grant, supra note 42.
1992-1993] 521
522 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL L WJOURNAL [Vol. 16:470
been hostile on the issue of accession of such "neutral"
states.274 As recently as 1987, the mere notion of reconciling
Sweden's and Finland's neutrality with EC membership ap-
peared inconceivable in view of their geographical proximity to
the Soviet Union.2 75 Delors' idea of the EEA was motivated at
least in part by an unwillingness to deal with the accession of
traditionally neutral countries.276
Neutrality will be much less of an issue in the future due to
the demise of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.
Although the TEU contains a provision permitting Ireland to
maintain its traditional neutrality, the latter has indicated that
it may forego that policy in view of geopolitical develop-
ments.277 Switzerland similarly indicated that its historical
neutrality will not pose a problem.278 In connection with its
recent application to the EC, Finland expressed the belief that
it can continue "staying outside military alliances" without
compromising its acceptance of European union and its objec-
tives of a common foreign and security policy.279 Commission
officials appear less sanguine, and underscore that newcomers
must adhere to all security and defense implications of the pro-
posed TEU.28 °
No comparable neutrality issues arise in connection with
any of the Visegrad trio. On the contrary, in the early post-
communist phase, they eagerly studied the post-World War II
defense-related institutional frameworks. Poland's particular
security-related concerns regarding the finality of its western
borders with a reunified Germany have been put to rest with
the conclusion of two bilateral treaties with Germany in late
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Brown, supra note 166.
277. New EC Members Must Take Full Package, Brittan Says, Reuter Libr. Rep., Mar.
6, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
278. The Week In Europe: Andriessen In U.S. for Talks with Baker, Origin Universal
News Services, May 28, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
279. Stephen Brown, Europe Needs a Neutral Finland, Premier Says, Reuter Libr.
Rep., Mar. 20, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File. Finland is appar-
ently counting on the fact that the WEU, apparently slated to become the Commu-
nity's "defense arm" does not currently include Denmark, Greece or Ireland. Id.
The Finnish statement appears to take for granted that its application will be consid-
ered jointly with those of Sweden and Austria rather than in the order in which it is
received.
280. New EC Members Must Take Full Package, Brittan Says, supra note 277.
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1990 and in mid-1991. 28 ' Thus, the Central Europeans in-
creasingly are interfacing with those security institutions in
which EC Member States participate, principally the Council of
Europe, NATO, the Western European Union (the "WEU"),
and the Conference on Security and Cooperation (the
"CSCE").282 The Community's eventual political union, tak-
ing place in a totally new international order on the European
continent, calls into play its future relations with these bodies.
Even in the still evolving political landscape of the new Eu-
rope, observers have discerned that Jacques Delors and a core
of Community leaders already have well-defined ideas about
the future defense role of the EC. There is an ongoing debate
whether the Community should create its own defense arm in
addition to its existing relationships with both NATO and the
Western European Union. France and Germany have pro-
posed a distinct EC defense identity and are currently advocat-
ing the creation of an initial Franco-German corps of some
35,000 troops to give the EC its own military capacity and are
calling upon other Member States to participate.283 Britain
and Italy support the existing NATO alliance2 84 while stressing
that the WEU should be merged into the EC.285
European defense and security are areas in which a
lengthy and gradual transition are foreseen 286 as the "security
281. See infra note 449 and accompanying text (discussing Poland's bilateral
treaties with Germany).
282. The Council of Europe is a French-based organization to which all EC and
EFTA Member States belong. The Council's Statutes mandate that each country ac-
knowledge and adopt basic principles of fundamental freedom and the rule of law.
See Frowein, supra note 19, at 1312. After becoming a signatory to the Convention
on Human Rights, Poland became a member in 1991, as did Czechoslovakia and
Hungary.
The February 1992 meeting in Strasbourg marked Poland's first official partici-
pation. Economic and Legal Information From Poland, vol. I, No. 9-11 (Nov. 1991).
The nine-member Western European Union (WEU) is a grouping that incudes
all EC countries except Denmark, Greece, and Ireland, and was "originally designed
to hedge against postwar German rearmament." Hans Binnendijk, The Emerging Eu-
ropean Security Order, 14 WASH. Q 67 (1991). The Conference on Security and Coop-
eration (CSCE) in Europe is a Soviet-inspired grouping that includes the United
States, Canada, and all European states except Albania. See Hugh De Santis, The
Graying of NATO, 14 WASH. Q. 51 (1991).
283. Davidson, supra note 52, at 2.
284. Redburn & Goldsmith, supra note 266.
285. Political Union: Difficult Return to Debate on EEC Foreign and Security Policy, Eur.
Rep., No. 1709, Oct. 5, 1991, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, ALLEUR File.
286. Krause & Schmidt, supra note 23.
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vacuum" created by the demise of the U.S.S.R. as a military
power refocuses on distinct current dangers such as armed
ethnic conflict. The new Central European democracies are
joining both existing institutions and a series of the surfacing
international organizations. For example, in December 1991,
an entity named the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (the
"NACC") met for the first time at NATO headquarters in
Brussels.28 7 Ajoint Declaration issued at the end of the Coun-
cil's first meeting reflects the Members' acute awareness of the
vast gulf the new democracies must traverse in attaining eco-
nomic and political stability. 288 The Joint Declaration foresees
"interlocking networks of such institutions as NATO, the EC,
and the CSCE. ' '289 The first of such networking relationships
has taken the form of a NATO "Work Plan for Dialogue, Part-
nership and Cooperation" with NACC members.2 90
Also new to the scene is the "Council of the Baltic Sea
States"' 29' formed with the active participation of the EC, and
designating itself as a "modern Hanseatic League." Thus, Po-
land's geographic location between Germany and Russia, "al-
beit historically her greatest misfortune, may turn out to be her
biggest asset in a new Europe. ' 292  Poland's location on the
287. Kaluzynska, supra note 118. NACC initially consisted of the 16 members of
NATO as well as Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and the Bal-
tic States. Several of the CIS nations have since joined.
288. " 'The success of efforts to create modem competitive market economies is
essential to overcoming grave economic disparities and thus enhancing our common
security and stability ... security depends on political, economic, social and environ-
mental factors as well as defense.' " NA TO and Former Warsaw Pact Meet Around Table of
Friendship, Agence France Presse, Dec. 20, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
OMNI File.
289. Id. German Foreign Minister Genscher recently "described the North At-
lantic Cooperation Council as a 'new support' in the new all-European architecture;
the others include the CSCE, the European Community, the European Council, and
NATO." Cooperation Council Welcomes New Members, WEEK GERMANY, Mar. 13, 1992.
290. The Plan is intended as "a practical expression of the cooperative partner-
ship between membership countries." Visit to Poland by British Ambassador to NATO,
PAP News Wire, Oct. 20, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
291. Its members are Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Germany, Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Russia. Henning Christopherson,
Deputy Chairman of the EC Commission, took part in the Council's founding confer-
ence; its initiators were Denmark and Germany. Juliusz Urbanowicz, Council of Baltic
Sea States: United Stand, Divided Interests, WARSAW VOICE, Mar. 15, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
292. MAREK KASZUBSKI, OVERVIEW OF THE LAW GOVERNING FOREIGN INVESTMENT
IN POLAND (1990).
POLAND AND THE EC
Baltic Sea places it squarely in the middle of the continent. 293
The stated aim of the Baltic Cooperation Council participants
is regional cooperation with the joint participation of the Com-
munity and, in particular "to support democratic institutions in
the newly created democratic countries, as well as providing
economic cooperation and humanitarian aid."' 294 Environmen-
tal protection, energy, transport, and communications are also
targeted for cooperation. At the Council's initial meeting in
Copenhagen, the non-EC members of the fledgling Council
hastened to utilize it as yet another forum for formally voicing
their common aim of EC membership, and appear to have read
express encouragement and implicit promises in the speeches
made by their Community neighbors.
Irrespective of growing regional ties, Poland's main secur-
ity-related focus has been on the one organization which it
views as the pillar of stability of Europe, NATO. 295 Although
NATO has advised Poland that NATO would not yet consider
it for membership,2 96 Poland has sought, along with the other
Central European countries, increased military and political
cooperation from NATO2 97 in the form of some minimal se-
curity guarantee. NATO initially rebuffed the Central Euro-
pean countries' overtures.298 It now appears that the desired
links with NATO will be facilitated by the NACC; however, as
with EC membership, Poland has set its ultimate sights on en-
try into NATO 299 and is restructuring its armed forces to facili-
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Former Prime Minister Bielecki Admits Making Errors, PAP News Wire, Dec. 2 i,
1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
296. Hungary was accepted into NATO's parliamentary arm, the North Atlantic
Council, as a non-voting associate in early 1991. Chronology 1991, 71 FOREIGN AFF.
184, 206 (Patricia Lee Dorff ed., America & the World 1991-1992).
297. Bielecki's Government Presents State of Nation Report, 1992 BBC, Summary of
World Broadcasts, Jan. 3, 1992, at EE/1268/B/1, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
OMNI File.
298. Bulgaria Callsfor NATO Security Guarantees, Agence France Presse, Dec. 20,
1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
299. See Adam Jasser, Polish Army Gets Overhaul with Eye to NA TO, Reuter Libr.
Rep., Oct. 26, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File; see NATO's Military
Chief Rules Out Polish Membership for Now, Agence France Presse, Mar. 12, 1992, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File. As a result, one Polish official "said it was
impossible for the moment to set a timetable for Polish entry into NATO, adding that
it was necessary to move forward 'step by step.' " Id.
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tate such entry.3 °0
B. The Other "Second Tier"--Malta, Cyprus, and Turkey
Turkey has been an associate of the EC since 1963, and
the agreement of association, which has been modified several
times, specifically refers to the possibility of Turkey's future
accession to the EC in the preamble and in Article 28. An ad-
ditional protocol in 1970 called for the creation of a customs
union over a twenty-two-year period commencing in 1973.30
By failing to ratify this aspect of the association agreement,
Greece has successfully blocked (primarily for political rea-
sons) the likelihood of such a free trade zone between Turkey
and the EC by 1995, an important Turkish objective. Turkey
then formally applied for EC membership in 1987. A full two
years elapsed before the Commission advised Turkey that its
application would not be considered until after 1992.32
Member States other than Greece have been deeply am-
bivalent about Turkey's accession. Specific concerns are Tur-
key's size and population which are larger than any Member
State, its substantially lower level of development than the Eu-
ropean average (fifty percent of workers are employed in agri-
culture), and its poor record on human rights.30 3 The Com-
mission Opinion on the Turkish application also signalled con-
tinued repression of political pluralism, long running disputes
with a particular Member State, and the situation in Cyprus.3 0 4
Notwithstanding, the Commission Opinion confirmed Tur-
key's eligibility for membership.0 5 Proponents of Turkish
membership, notably the United States, point to the fact that
Turkey, a member of NATO, has made important contribu-
tions to European security. Such contributions include Turk-
ish cooperation in the 1991 Gulf War and that the accession of
a primarily Islamic state would create a much needed bridge
between Europe and the Islamic countries.3 6
300. Jasser, supra note 299.
301. EC Commission, The European Community's Relations with Turkey, RAPID,
Sept. 27, 1991, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, ALLEUR File.
302. Bruce R. Kuniholm, Turkey and the West, 70 FOREIGN AFF. 34 (Spring 1991).
303. Id.
304. See EC Commission, supra note 301.
305. See id.
306. Id.
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Malta has had three association agreements with the EC
commencing in 1971; the provisions of the current agreement
run through 1993.307 Aware that the queue for EC member-
ship was rapidly lengthening, Malta put in its formal applica-
tion in July 1990.308 The Commission is in the process of pre-
paring its report on the application?. 9 Malta's submittal thus
follows those of Austria, Turkey, and Cyprus but it already has
plans for all new legislation to be drafted in line with EC regu-
lations, and for all current laws, taxes, and tariffs to be ad-
justed in stages. 310 The Commission is aware that membership
for Malta would make it a greater beneficiary of EC "structural
funds ' 311 than a contributor to the Community's budget
because "it is estimated that Malta would Contribute
[£10,000,000 to £11,000,000] annually, but would receive
[£30,000,000] in return ... [t]here would also be the prospect
of tapping various other EC funds. ' 312 Member States such as
Spain, which benefit greatly from EC development funds, are
less inclined to support accession of developing countries that
are likely to compete for the same funds; conversely, they hope
that the accession of the EFTA countries would induce the lat-
ter to invest in the southern Member States.313
Emerging concerns about increasing Germany's voting
power may indirectly prejudice the Maltese application, at least
until such time as major institutional reform is achieved on
Member States' voting rights. Addressing a Maltese audience
in early 1992, Sir Leon Brittan of the EC Commission warned
that Malta's small size could hinder its accession ambitions; an-
other tiny Member State would further exacerbate the existing
imbalance inherent in the Council's "weighted" voting struc-
307. Richard Evans, Malta-Hurdles in the Way of Early EC Membership-Lively Debate
Over Malta's Application to the European Community, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1991, at IV
(stating that "Malta has benefitted greatly from increased trade. Around 75 per cent
of its trade is now with EC countries").
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Structural funds were introduced by the Community in 1987 for the pur-
pose of accelerating the development of the less wealthy Member States. See infra
notes 466-75 and accompanying text.
312. Evans, supra note 307, at IV.
313. Christopher Lynch, Spain: 1992 and Beyond, 112 Bus. AM. 2, Aug. 26, 1991.
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ture.31 4 Sir Leon stressed that, for example, minuscule Lux-
embourg has one full vote, whereas a unified Germany has
only two. 31 5 Reports on the Commission's future plans to
restructure the Commission's presidency which currently ro-
tates every six months so as to preclude a "minnow" state from
managing foreign policy 31 6 also appear to indicate that Malta
and Cyprus might not be welcome unless and until such re-
forms are firmly in place.
With the near simultaneous conclusion of the Europe
Agreements and the TEU, the newly evolving conventional
wisdom is that membership for Cyprus, Malta, and Turkey, in
particular the last, is unlikely to precede that of the Central
European candidates. 17 Future accessions are now foreseen
in two major "waves"-the EFTA states followed by Hungary,
Czechoslovakia, and Poland. 8 Certain Community officials
have of late been stressing that a "small, fast enlargement" to
include the EFTA countries is a de facto prerequisite to the
more complex accession of the Central European states.3 9 In
the interim, the Central European States must attain an ade-
quate economic level and political stability. 2 ° If they are suc-
cessful, their accession appears to pose fewer perceived ethnic
dilemmas-the notion that their history and culture are equally
"European" appears to be taking ever firmer root in the minds
314. Extracts from a Speech by Sir Leon Brittan at the Chamber of Commerce,
Valletta, Malta, reprinted in Commission Press Release, IP (92) 36 (Jan. 20, 1992).
315. Id.
316. Observers anticipate that the Commission may propose "an average of
fewer than one commissioner per country" and that larger countries "especially Ger-
many-should have more weight in the European Parliament." A Sea of Change,
ECONOMIST, Mar. 14, 1992, at 55.
317. See, e.g., Europe's Open Future, ECONOMIST, Feb. 22, 1992, at 47. "Enlarge-
ment raises an invidious question: who to leave out. Turkey has already been rebuf-
fed once. Cyprus and Malta, who have applied, may also be asked to come back later.
It is not only to the east that Europe's borders grow fuzzy. The Mediterranean helps,
but where, to the south, does Europe stop?" Id.; see William Drozdiak, Finland Applies
for EC Membership; Community Reassesses Growth Plans Amid Surge of New Candidates,
WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 1992, at A20.
318. See A Sea of Change, supra note 316, at 55; David'Buchan, All at Sea In Europe:
Why the EC Ship of State is Drifting, FIN. TIMES, May 5, 1992, at 18; Joe Fitchett, EC
Quandary: Conveying the Spirit of Maastricht, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 10, 1992.
319. Henning Christophersen, Speech to the Finnish Institute of International
Studies, Helsinki, May 21, 1992, reprinted in Commission Press Release IP (92) 415
(May 22, 1992).
320. Id.
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of western European opinion leaders.32 '
V. PARL4YING ASSOCIATION INTO ACCESSION
A. The Major Hurdles-General Observations
The Community's attitude toward eventual accession of
the three new associates was summarized succinctly by the EC
Commission's chief negotiator of the Europe Agreements,
Pablo Benavides. The association agreements will provide
both sides with a "good trial run on the pro's and con's of EC
membership [but are] . . . by no means a ticket for admis-
sion."' 32 2 In regards to the probability of Poland parlaying its
current associate status into full EC membership within the
next decade, several observations can be made. First and fore-
most is the relatively "objective" criterion inherent in the EEC
Treaty that an aspiring state must have a relatively stable dem-
ocratic form of government which, by definition, means it must
have a functioning, free market economy in place. 23 Second,
and much more difficult to ascertain as of this writing, is the
impact of any amendments to the EEC Treaty which may result
from the TEU. Third, and equally difficult to ascertain are the
more purely political positions on expansion that will be evi-
denced by the EC Commission and the collective will of the
then-current Member States. If all seven EFTA countries are
absorbed by 1995, seventeen Member States will be involved
in the process and the EC Commission will comprise a new
constituency. There is already some concern that "the Com-
321. Id. Luxembourg's Prime Minister is quoted as opining as follows:
Countries are going to arrive in waves. There should not be any problem
about incorporating Austria and other countries in EFTA. We will have to
consider Hungary and Czechoslovakia and perhaps with slightly less cer-
tainty, Poland. It's inconceivable for a new Europe not to include countries
whose history and cultures are so intertwined with ours. The Baltic States, I
think should initially seek to form an economic union on the Benelux
model.
Id.
322. EC Initials New Free Trade Accord with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, supra
note 209, at 1720-21 .
323. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 8b. The relationship between democracy
and a market economy is explained by Mr. Pinder as follows: "It is doubtful whether
a command economy is compatible with pluralist democracy. It has long been argued
that a market economy is the economic aspect of civil society and there have been no
examples of pluralist democracies with command economies." PINDER, supra note
117, at 45.
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munity may raise the drawbridges after the rich EFTA nations
enter."
324
Present-day politics place Britain firmly in the pro-
Visegrad camp. Britain announced that one of the top priori-
ties of its six-month EC presidency would be to assist Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and Hungary to consolidate their reforms and
join the EC as full members prior to the end of the decade,32 5
perhaps even as early as 1996.326 British Prime Minister John
Major espouses the view that the Community should welcome
all European countries that are willing to join and to take on
the responsibilities of membership. 2 7 John Major's ostensible
commitment to their cause was welcome news for the three as-
sociates, but they had not reckoned with the complications un-
expectedly encountered by the EC with ratification of the TEU.
Suddenly the Community's plate was full (again) and Prime
Minister Major became increasingly bogged down with issues
of integration which were much closer to home. 28
Further, the Community's stated intent to conclude "Eu-
rope Agreements" with countries such as Bulgaria and
Romania appears to have triggered a perception that the once
symbolic impact of the nomenclature is being diluted. In what
appears to have been a dry run for the London Summit, Po-
land, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia in September 1992 submit-
ted a joint memorandum to the EC Commission, pressing for
324. Redburn, supra note 268, at 37.
325. UK to Use EC Presidency to Help New Democracies, Reuter Libr. Rep., Feb. 4,
1992. Reuters quotes the following Foreign Office statement: "The Community
must forge closer relationships with other European states, welcoming as members
those countries who apply and are ready for membership both politically and eco-
nomically." Id. "Britain will seek to use its presidency of the EC in July to begin the
process of expanding the organisation to include countries such as Sweden, the new
democracies of Eastern Europe and, eventually, Russia ... Mr. Hurd, Foreign Secre-
tary, [stated]." Parliament and Politics: Tories to Seek Expansion, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Feb.
5, 1992, at 13.
326. Ivor Owen, Hurd Urges Caution in EC: Premature Transfer of More Power to Brus-
sels will be Resisted, FIN. TIMES, May 9, 1992.
327. Philip Webster, Major Calls for EC to be Enlarged, TIMES, Mar. 10, 1992.
328. Failure of Vision, INDEPENDENT, Oct. 29, 1992, at 26.
One of the many good reasons for getting the Maastricht treaty out of the
way as soon as possible is that its'travails are distracting attention from the
looming problems of central and eastern Europe. If the European Commu-
nity fails to rise to the challenge they pose, its internal wrangles will pale
into irrelevance beside the turbulence on its doorstep.
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prompt ratification of their respective treaties, further trade
liberalization for food, textiles, and steel, and most impor-
tantly, urging a target date for entering into formal member-
ship negotiations "no later than 1996. ' 329 Additionally, they
pressed the Community to articulate objective criteria "whose
fulfillment would be required for starting talks on member-
ship. '330 No formal response from the Community is foreseen
prior to the conclusion of the Edinburgh Summit in December
1992; 33' however, Western European commentators have been
quick to opine that the EC's reaction will be less than enthusi-
astic. 3 2
The London Summit took place as scheduled in late Octo-
ber 1992. John Major and Jacques Delors met with Polish,
Hungarian, Czech, and Slovak representatives in London; it
was the highest level meeting to date.3 3 The Visegrad group
extracted a promise that the eligibility criteria for which they
have pressed would be forthcoming prior to the Community's
Edinburgh Summit in December 1992.73 On the whole, how-
ever, they appear to have gained little more than further
promises of "regular political contacts" geared toward "devel-
oping closer cooperation in areas of mutual interest"3 35 as well
as training, commercial exchanges, and parliamentary visits as
a follow-up to the Europe Agreements. 33 6 Neither trade liber-
329. EC/Visegrad States: 1996 Remains Target Date for Membership Talks, Eur. Rep.,
Oct. 24, 1992, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, ALLEUR File.
330. Poland-EC Treaty Blocked, GAZETA WYBORCZA, No. 251, Oct. 24-25, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
331. Id.
332. Lionel Barber, Danube Row Hits Plan to Widen EC, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1992,
at 4. "So far the EC has reacted coolly because [of] the huge economic disparities."
Id. "The European Community is likely to tell Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia
... that they are bringing up the rear... " McEvoy, supra note 263.
333. Andrew Marshall, EC to Improve Links with East Europe, INDEPENDENT, Oct.
29, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
334. Id.
335. Id.; see Failure of Vision, INDEPENDENT, Oct. 29, 1992, at 26. "Friendly assur-
ances and pious hopes were in plentiful supply. The reality, however, is that the
Community's response to the opportunities in eastern Europe has been shamefully
inadequate'and short-sighted." Id.
336. Marshall, supra note 333, at 9.
Major and Delors said they welcomed the meeting as a demonstration of
European Community support for all the newly democratising countries of
Eastern and Central Europe. The summit agreed to encourage intensified,
practical cooperation .... [Flour areas were marked out: more open and
liberal markets, local and democratic links, training and education, and par-
1992-19931
532 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALL4WJOURNAL [Vol. 16:470
alization concessions nor a specific timetable for accession
were obtained by any of the Visegrad group. Commission
President Delors stated only that "[a]s soon as it appears that
these countries are prepared to join the Community, we will
accept them." '"37
B. Looking Ahead
Attempting to buttress their claims that 1996 represents a
realistic target date for commencing accession negotiations,
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary jointly identified those
economic objectives that they feel can be achieved over the
next several years. These include macroeconomic stability,
microeconomic liberalization, external trade liberalization,
privatization, and economic restructuring that the three coun-
tries anticipate will be greatly accelerated by the establishment
of the free trade area between them. 38
Thus, credible predictions of the future can only be based
on an assessment of how countries such as Poland are likely to
succeed in meeting the objective target of a stable, pluralistic
form of government and a Western economic structure. To
describe this target as gargantuan in itself is an understate-
ment because the combined effect of World War II and forty-
five years of a "centrally planned" economy effectively obliter-
ated the Polish capital market.
Polish President Walesa announced to the Council of Eu-
rope in February 1992 that Poland will not be able to stay its
current course without considerable continued Western aid.
Appealing to the "self-interests" of the West as the basis for
sustained economic aid, Mr. Walesa identified, from the Polish
viewpoint, the major hurdles confronting its continued transi-
tion. First, when Poland undertook the transition to a market
economy, the West's most notable response was to flood Po-
lish markets with Western goods, thus draining scarce cash re-
sources, but doing little in the area of modernizing domestic
liamentary links . . .although Mr. Major told a press conference later that
there was no fixed timetable for full accession to the EC.
The Week in Europe: Major and Delors Host Visegrad, Summit Press Assoc. Newsfile, Oct.
29, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
337. Marshall, supra note 333.
338. EC/Visegrad States: 1996 Remains Target Date for Membership Talks, supra note
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industry and job development, the only factors that can pro-
duce long-term political stability. 39 Second, in Polish opinion,
the West's recent fiscal passiveness increases Poland's risk of
straying from the difficult road to democracy and could even
provoke a return to totalitarianism. Third, continued eco-
nomic difficulties in Poland could give rise to the mass migra-
tion of economic refugees of which the West is so fearful. Mr.
Walesa also stressed that while foreign investment in Poland
may now appear unattractive in the short term, Poland is a
highly desirable location for investors.340
President Walesa's words were not per se "news" either to
the Community or to other Western countries; they merely
tied the principal themes of the East's perceptions together.
PHARE recipients other than Poland have repeatedly stated
that the amounts of money available are inadequate as com-
pared against their needs. 3 4 1 The Community for some time
now has expressed concern that the G-24 funds are no longer
forthcoming at the same rate and that the Community itself has
been called upon to shoulder an increasing portion of the ex-
penses.34 2 Nor have the draconian impacts of economic
339. Walesa Says West Partly to Blame for Rise of "Various Nationalisms," BBC, Sum-
mary of World Broadcasts, Feb. 19, 1992, at EE/1308/AI/I, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, OMNI File (stating that "[Walesa] repeated his often stated metaphor that
the post-communist societies needed 'a fishing rod not a fish', in other words help
from the West that would allow them to stand on their own two feet").
340. Christopher Bobinski, Poland: Walesa's Vision of Apocalypse Ignored, OB-
SERVER, Feb. 9, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File; Walesa Urges West
to do Business with Poland, PAP News Wire, Feb. 5, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, OMNI File.
341. MERRITr, supra note 14, at 74-75. Czech officials have stressed that PHARE
is barely a fraction of what they need. Yugoslav officials concluded some time ago
that PHARE was "overblown": "[N]ow in 1991 we can see that PHARE is not going
to make a big difference in switching Eastern European countries to becoming mar-
ket economies." Id. at 75-76.
342. Mr. Merritt's observation, which predates President Walesa's address, indi-
cates that such a result was long in the making:
There is, though, a trend that is giving rise to concern on both sides of the
Atlantic. The United States and the Western European nations are not
working together as the single team that had been hoped for. The Europe-
ans complain that the U.S. government has grown steadily less supportive of
financial packages for Eastern Europe and appears to take the view that
Eastern Europe "is a European problem." About half of G-24 financial
assistance is subscribed by the 12 EC nations, and less than seven percent by
the U.S. In some cases, Washington has offered only derisory contributions
when Brussels has passed round the G-24 hat, notably when raising funds
for loans to Czechoslovakia and Hungary.
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"shock policies" on the Polish populace gone unnoticed by the
world, the high social costs being borne by the average con-
sumer include growing unemployment 343 as inefficient and un-
competitive industries are closed down, recession, bankrupt-
cies, and hyper-inflation.3 44 Poland's latest political crisis re-
volved in significant part around the grim necessity of making
deep cuts in social spending "at a time when unemployment is
soaring and thousands of families are dropping below the offi-
cial poverty level." 34
5
Both Poland and the West are now realizing that the tran-
sitional phase will be more complex and will take longer than
first anticipated. The Polish government concedes that too
much hope was aroused prematurely that the transition would
take a matter of months rather than years.346 As in Czechoslo-
vakia and Hungary, when the newly democratic governments
came into power, they were "clear on why the old system
ought to be replaced but much less specific on how to achieve
economic transformation. 3 47
Measuring democracy is not overly difficult. Its bench-
mark is free elections, which Poland achieved in October
1991.348 The mechanics of economic restructuring, however,
are proving vastly more difficult than political transition. The
continued danger to stability is that the well-being of the polit-
Id. at 72-73.
343. A Russian critic of the "shock therapy" approach notes that
shock therapy ignores the basic concepts of division of labor in an advanced
industrialized society. Most of the people of Czechoslovakia, Poland and
Russia have committed their lives to developing highly specialized skills for
heavy industries. Vast numbers of these people are being asked to abandon
their training and experience, and, without an adequate adjustment phase,
take part in an amorphous "market" building itself up from scratch.
Valtr Komarek, Shock Therapy and Its Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1992, at 13.
344. Bielecki's Government Presents State of Nation Report, BBC, Summary of World
Broadcasts, Jan. 3, 1992, at EE/1268/B/1, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI
File.
345. Iwona Knothe, Poland: Parliament Schedules Meeting to Approve New Prime Min-
ister, Inter Press, June 5, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
346. Former Prime Minister Bielecki Admits Making Errors, PAP News Wire, Dec. 21,
1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
347. Zielonka, supra note 78, at 107.
348. The elections ofJune 1989, which made Tadeusz Mazowiecki the first non-
communist prime minister of post World War II, were in reality only "semi-free,"
being tied to the existing communist electoral system.
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ical structure in large measure depends on the well-being of
the economic structure.
As noted above, a combination of various measures of a
market economy are utilized. Some analysts stress purely
quantifiable measures: currency convertibility, privatization,
competitiveness, and efficiency of domestic production within
a legal system ensuring their existence.34 9 Others stress the
particular post-communist context in which the transition must
take place: an "absolute public and governmental will" 350 to
make the transition; an "adequate legal framework; 351  the
government's launching its own initiative "to overhaul infra-
structure and foster new industries; "352 substantial investment
by private capital; and a successful "transfusion of Western
know-how and technology. ' 353 It emerges as axiomatic that an
appropriate legal framework is the common thread that can
serve to create, maintain, and promote these diverse elements.
Foreign investors are understandably hesitant to plunge into
uncharted legal waters. The lack of a sufficient legal infrastruc-
ture has hampered European commercial bank financing.354
Experts stress that one of Poland's top priorities must be "a
clear legal order. ' 355 Presently, its "ever-changing legal regu-
lations create a lot of confusion and uncertainty" that only
serve to reinforce a perception that frequent cabinet reshuf-
fling in unstable governments directly harms foreign firms that
have received permission for business activities and the fear
that such permission may be modified or revoked by a succes-
sor. Because one of the principal means of attaining a free
market economy is based upon attracting and maintaining sig-
nificant foreign investment, an examination of the current,
evolving, and projected development of those aspects of Po-
land's legal system is appropriate. In the immediate future,
Polish law will evolve both under the impetus of external
forces, such as the Europe Agreements and requests from the
349. Sadurska, supra note 12, at 2501.
350. MERRiTr, supra note 14, at 76 (describing work.of Belgian industrialist An-
dre Leysen).
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Webb, supra note 146, at 17.
355. Whitehead: "Do Not Stop Halfvay ", RZECZPOSPOLrrA, No. 131, reprinted in Po-
LISH NEws BULL., June 4, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
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G-24 donors,3 56 as well as through domestic efforts to create a
legal climate reflective of its political and economic transitional
efforts. This transformation will be based on two pillars: ac-
celerated liberalization and privatization 7
C. The Current State of Polish Law and Its Relation to the
Development of a Market Economy
Although there has been a major proliferation of small
and medium size companies in the private sector,358 other eco
nomic prospects appear less than bright. Poland's equivalent
of its most recent "state of the union" address 359 painted a
bleak picture of extensive environmental pollution, reces-
sion,360 living conditions among the worst in Europe, persis-
tent inflation, and inefficient manufacturing resulting in ever-
lower Treasury revenues.3 6 1 The report attributed the greatest
356. The G-24 has stressed the need for countries such as Poland to ensure
adequate legislative protection of private investment along the lines of existing
OECD regulations. 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1556 (Nov. 13, 1991).
357. Cezary Banasinski, Regional Developments, 25 INr'L LAw. 755, 771 (1991).
Professor Banasinski describes Poland's evolving legal framework as comprising
three principle elements: "privatization of the economy's state sector, the decentrali-
zation of administration and denationalization of state-owned property, and the re-
duction of the state's monopolistic position in some domains." Id.
358. The Polish Central Planning Agency reports some 1,500,000 private busi-
nesses in existence at the end of 1991, a 25% increase over 1990, employing 38% of
the total workforce, excluding agriculture. Poland. Development of Private Sector in 1991,
BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts, Mar. 19, 1992, at EE/W0222/A/1, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
359. Report on Poland's Condition, NOWA EUROPA, Feb. 11, 1992, reprinted in POLISH
NEWS BULL., Feb. 11, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
360. Report on the State of the Nation, Rzeczpospolita No. 36, reprinted in POLISH
NEWS BULL., Feb. 12, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File. At the end
of 1990 nearly 44% of working households and more than 50% of retirees were
living below the official poverty line. European Update: Doing Business in Poland, supra
note 59, at *25.
361. Cf Former Finance Minister Balcerowicz, Remarks to the US-Poland
Chamber of Commerce, New York (Mar. 19, 1992). Balcerowicz summarized his
view of the positive results produced by his "shock policies" as follows:
(1) The free market has evolved greatly-there is a full supply of all consumer
goods, although there is still a preference for Western-made goods on the part of
Polish consumers. He stressed that Polish products were becoming increasingly well-
made and competitive; (2) while the decline in COMECON trade has hit Poland hard,
there is improvement in foreign trade; (3) the Paris Club's reduction of Poland's for-
eign debt provides a positive impetus for the economy; (4) much progress has been
achieved in price levels--over 90% of products are now priced at levels dictated by
supply and demand; (5) Polish currency, the zloty, is fully convertible; (6) Poland has
an extremely dynamic private sector that has created some 6,000,000 new jobs and
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difficulties in the transition to the disappearance of long-time
trading partners as a result of the collapse of COMECON and
the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. 6 2 The Polish legal system is
described as a disjointed hodgepodge of statutes dating from
different eras, replete with loopholes and inconsistences, and
thus totally inadequate to address current legislative, social,
and economic concerns. Not only do most sectors of Polish
life require a complete legislative overhaul, the current compli-
cated legal processes for enacting legislation, adequate per-
haps in a period of stability, now operate as a barrier to further
reforms.3 63
The report's gloomy forecast is already proving to be true
as the increased economic pain endured by Poles has produced
a political backlash. Poland's current electoral law is a last-
minute legacy of the previously communist parliament that
pushed the law through in a desperate effort to improve its
chances in the first free elections: "[t]he result was a weak and
divided parliament ... which makes effective government im-
possible." 364
1. Constitutional Reform
In the absence of strong and unequivocal constitutional
guarantees of property rights in post-communist countries
such as Poland, foreign investors may tend to limit themselves
to short-term projects with high short-term returns. This in
turn can exacerbate their image as "mere speculators" on the
part of the Central Europeans.3 65 Foreign investors must have
legal certainty as to their rights of ownership in property that
they wish to acquire.366 It is therefore imperative that basic
constitutional principles of "separation of powers, federalism,
and protection of individual rights (including economic liber-
some 6000 new privately owned business [primarily retail businesses, services and
construction]; (7) the basics of a new legal framework are well under way, particularly
statutes such as the recent Law on Foreign Investments which permits full repatria-
tion of profits.
Id.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Make Poland Governable, FIN. TIMES, May 7, 1992, at 22.
365. Richard A. Epstein, All Quiet on the Eastern Front, 58 U. Cm. L. REV. 555, 571
(1991).
366. See Whitehead: "Do Not Stop Halfway," supra note 355.
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ties) ' '3 67 be unequivocally spelled out.
The current Polish Constitution, 68 which serves primarily
to define state bodies and their respective powers, was enacted
in 1952 and was closely patterned on the language and polit-
ical theory of the 1936 Soviet Constitution. Its net effect was
to entrench the Communist Party, rather than the Constitu-
tion, as the real source of law over the next three and a half
decades. 36 9 This Soviet-influenced document was repugnant
to Poles, not only because it espoused "brotherhood" with the
Soviet Union, and was highly reminiscent of tsarist oppression
in the nineteenth century, but also because it perverted the
rules of constitutional law inherent in Poland's own rich centu-
ries-old constitutional history.. 7 Poland's Constitution of May
3, 1791 is far from being an obscure historical footnote. 7' On
the contrary, during the communist regime that had endeav-
ored to impose the socialist celebration of May 1st, the Polish
populace annually braved riot police and even tanks to com-
memorate the third of May as the symbol of a legitimate gov-
ernmental model. The prompt reinstatement of May 3rd as a
national holiday by the new democratic government was one of
the most powerful symbols that Soviet domination was no
more. The 1791 constitution was the first written European
constitution, and already embodied seven centuries of consti-
tutional development based upon the evolving principles of
placing restraints on the powers of the monarchy, of govern-
ment by consensus and representation of the people.3 72 Based
367. See Epstein, supra note 364, at 557. Professor Epstein makes the following
observation concerning constitutional reform in the region that "[ilt will take uncom-
mon foresight, heroic measures and massive good fortune for Eastern Europe to hit
upon the constitutional measures and economic policies needed to overcome the
devastation wrought by communist political rule and socialist economic order." Id.
at 557-58.
368. KONST-YTUCJA POLSKIEJ RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ LUDOWEJ [Constitution] (Pol.).
369. Mark Brzezinski, Note, Constitutional Heritage and Renewal: The Case of Poland,
77 VA. L. REV. 49 (1991) [hereinafter M. Brzezinski].
370. Id.
371. Since the Union of Lublin in 1569, Poland and Lithuania had belonged to
an early historical form of federation known as the "Commonwealth of Two Na-
tions." It was a dual state comprising three countries: Poland, Lithuania, and Russia.
The latter in turn gave rise to Byelorussia and Ukraine. See generally ADAM ZAMOYSKI,
THE POLISH WAY 93-94, 105-106 (1987).
372. For example, the Constitution of 1505 already placed important restric-
tions on the King by precluding the enactment of any laws without the participation
of the Seym. See Wagner, supra note 85, at 3. Article V of the 1791 Constitution
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upon the concept of the separation of powers, it allocated leg-
islative power to the Seym, executive power to the monarch and
his counsellors, and judicial powers to the court system. 73
The eighteenth century notion of "the people" did not actually
mean genuine popular sovereignty in the sense of including
the peasantry. However, the notion of citizenry was an increas-
ingly expanding one,3 74 and the constitution explicitly con-
ferred upon the peasantry unprecedented legal protection.375
Shortly after its enactment, however, Poland ceased to exist as
a nation for the next 130 years; it was "partitioned" between
Russia, Prussia, and Austria, and thus subject to the oppressive
legal orders of the partitioning powers.. 76 . Poland did not
reemerge as an independent state recognized by the Treaty of
Versailles until after World War J.377 Two constitutions were
adopted in the brief time frame of independence, in 1921 and
again in 1935; both claimed to reprise the principles of the
Constitution of 1791.378 The 1935 document was short-lived,
because of the simultaneous German and Soviet invasions in
1939, which were followed by military occupation until 1945,
and immediately gave way to four decades of Soviet domina-
tion.
Thus, when democratic rebirth commenced in Poland in
1989, the Seym, by then firmly controlled by freely elected rep-
resentatives of Solidarity, announced the creation of a Consti-
spelled out the still-revolutionary notion that "all power in the human community
derives from the will of the nation." Id.
373. Id.
374. See generally id.
375. Id. "While the peasantry gained no political participation rights from the
new constitution, it did entitle them to the 'protection of national law.' Among
others things, this meant that contracts between the peasantry and the nobility now
had legal standing." M. Brzezinski, supra note 369, at 66-67 (citing R. Ludwikowski,
Two Firsts: A Comparative Study of the American and the Polish Constitutions, 8 MICH. Y.B.
INT'L LEGAL STUD. 117, 117 (1987)).
In 1794, a proclamation entitled Uniwersal Polaniecki, issued by Tadeusz Kos-
ciuszko (the hero of the American Revolution) vested civil rights in the peasantry. See
POLISH LAW THROUGHOUT THE AGES, supra note 85, at 388.
376. Waclaw W. Soroka, The Law in the Polish Lands During the Partition Periods, in
POLISH LAW THROUGHOUT THE AGES, supra note 85, at 119. "The oppressive and dis-
criminatory laws of the occupants were intended to limit the rights of the Polish pop-
ulation with respect to land, property, possessions, religion, and national language
and aspirations." Id. at 129.
377. See generally ZAMOYSKI, supra note 371.
378. M. Brzezinski, supra note 369, at 73.
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tutional Commission for the purpose of drafting an all-new
democratic constitution. In the interim, it was, for practical
purposes, determined to maintain the basic structure set forth
in the 1952 constitution, subject to several immediate amend-
ments mandated by the new political climate 379 such as the es-
tablishment of the bicameral parliamentary body consisting of
the Seym and the Senate, the deletion of all references to Po-
land as a socialist state and the communist party,38° and the
restoration of the country's name as the "Republic of Poland."
Other amendments were aimed at the reinstatement of a de-
centralized and locally autonomous governmental structure.3 8
The revised Article 6 of the constitution now guarantees the
right and the freedom to carry on activities to all persons, irre-
spective of their public or private status. 82 Other provisions
mandate equal treatment of all forms of property ownership in
all sectors of the economy.
On the bicentennial date of May 3, 1991, ajoint session of
the Seym and the Senate declared the importance of eventual
ratification of the proposed new constitution by both bodies at
such time as all of their constituent members would hold such
office as the result of fully free elections,383 thus acknowledg-
ing that the representatives voted into office in the elections
scheduled for October 1991 would more accurately reflect the
will of the citizenry. As of this writing, the draft submitted to
the Parliament by the Constitutional Committee 384 in late 1991
has been the subject of several parliamentary debates as have
alternate drafts elaborated by a senate committee and several
political parties.385 While varying to some degree in areas con-
cerning the electoral processes and the precise allocation of
powers between the executive, legislative, and judicial
379. Id. at 89.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 90.
382. European Update: Doing Business in Poland, supra note 59, at *88; see KoN-
STYTUCJA POLSKIEj RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ LUDOWEJ [Constitution] (Pol.).
383. Stanislaw Gebethner, From One Constitution to Another, WARSAW VOICE, May
5, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.'
384. The Constitutional Committee recommended the establishment of a Con-
stitutional Tribunal, modelled on German law, that would enable private persons to
test the constitutionality of legislation. See Andrzej Rapaczynski, Constitutional Politics
in Poland: A Report on the Constitutional Committee of the Polish Parliament, 58 U. Cm. L.
REV. 595 (1991).
385. Gebethner, supra note 383.
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branches, all have in common a firmly articulated protection of
fundamental human rights, due process, and private property
rights. After agreement is reached on a final version, it will be
submitted to a public referendum prior to adoption.
2. The Commercial Code
The Polish Commercial Code is a prime example of a pre-
World War II legislative enactment dating from the period of
independence, portions of which either were dormant for de-
cades or were repealed piecemeal under the communist re-
gime, that has a sudden new vitality in a legal system struggling
to keep up with political reforms. The Commercial Code first
came into existence in 1934. Based on French, German, and
Swiss law, it contained several important innovations such as a
modern and flexible definition of "merchant" and protection
of minority shareholders. 8 6 During the communist tenure,
certain provisions of the Commercial Code, such as those deal-
ing with limited partnerships, were suppressed by the intro-
duction of socialist legal norms.38 7
In August 1991, the Seym adopted several amendments to
the 1934 legislation. Remarkably, the first of these was actually
a reintroduction of the concept of limited partnership which
had been repealed in 1964.388 The 1934 Code's original provi-
sions governing general partnerships, limited liability, and
joint stock companies, including the regulations concerning
their formation and commercial registration, remain entirely
viable and are expected to gain increasing importance in view
of the fact that they represent the principle mechanisms for
establishing private companies in Poland. 8 9
386. See generally Bronislaw Helczynski, The Law of the Reborn.State, in POLISH LAW
THROUGHOUT THE AGES, supra note 85, at 139 (discussing Polish law between 1918
and 1939). Mr. Helczynski notes that the European codes preceding the Polish Com-
mercial Code relied on an arbitrary and illogical classification of "acts of commerce."
The 1934 Polish code introduced a definition of "merchant" as "any person who
conducts a profit-making business," and deliberately left the latter term "business"
open to a case by case definition.
387. See, e.g., European Update: Doing Business in Poland, supra note 59.
388. The second amendment, reflecting inflationary realities, increased the min-
imum capitalization requirements of limited liability companies and joint stock com-
panies. Id.
389. Id. Some 45,000 private companies, 17,300 cooperatives, and 4800 joint
ventures have been established under the Code. Private Sector Accelerates, NOWA Eu-
ROPA, Mar. 17, 1992, at 11, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
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3. Legislation in Furtherance of a Market
Economy-Privatization
Since its empowerment in mid-1989, the Seym has enacted
more than a dozen pieces of legislation designed to implement
free-market economy principles and to attract foreign invest-
ment.3 90 The keystone is a comprehensive legislative and eco-
nomic program providing for the privatization of the vast ma-
jority of business activity formerly carried on solely by the gov-
ernment. The centerpiece is the Act on Privatization of State
Owned Enterprises ("Privatization Act" and "SOEs" respec-
tively) ofJuly 13, 1990,39 1 which also established a new Minis-
try of Privatization ("MOP") to oversee and implement this
vast project. Technically, the privatization process involves
either an offer to third parties of shares of an SOE (privatiza-
tion through capitalization) or an offering of the assets of the
SOE (capitalization through liquidation). The originally
targeted, and in retrospect highly optimistic, scope of priva-
tization was to cover 4000 SOEs of a total 8000 enterprises in
the first three years. Thousands of such inefficient enterprises
had existed for years solely for the purpose of trade with other
COMECON countries "but often provid[ed] sustenance to en-
tire communities. "392
Hoping to effectuate a restructuring of the economy with
minimal disruption of ongoing "businesses," the Polish gov-
ernment opted for a "sectoral" approach to privatization. This
approach utilizes a macroeconomic concept that is based on
identifying a consistent strategy to privatization by sector, as
opposed to the needs of a given SOE. The MOP thus under-
took a sectoral "mapping" of thirty defined and internationally
recognized industrial sectors, ranging from Oil Processing and
Distribution to Footwear to various categories of food process-
ing, 39 to ensure that potential investors are provided with
390. In addition to the statutes discussed below, another example is a new in-
come tax law which is more in line with free market entrepreneurial activities. See
Law of July 5, 1991 on Income Tax from Individuals, Dziennik Ustaw of 1991, No.
80, Item 350.
391. Banasinski, supra note 357, at 772 (citing Dziennik Ustaw of 1990, No. 51,
Item 298, amended by Law of November 29, 1990, Dziennik Ustaw of 1990, No. 55,
Item 127).
392. The Way Ahead for Poland, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1992.
393. EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND, COMMERCIAL COUNSELLOR'S OFFICE,
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meaningful information and that similar industries are handled
consistently. The underlying rationale of this mapping process
is that each individual sector presumably encompasses the
same type of problems and will be susceptible to the same
types of improvements. 9 4 The sectoral approach is also
designed to maximize the critical interplay between the legal
mechanics of ownership transfer and the ability of these se-
verely outdated and inefficient companies to switch as rapidly
as possible to Western norms and technology. The practical
benefits that the MOP foresees as resulting from this approach
include economies of scale, increased bargaining power due to
the MOP's participation and approval of each privatization
transaction, and the ability to control "cherry picking" of only
the more lucrative SOEs.
a. Privatization Through "Transformation"
i. Public Offerings
The Privatization Act provides two legal mechanisms,
"transformation" and "liquidation," for restructuring SOEs
and formal transfers of membership. The transformation pro-
cess involves several stages. The first is full conversion of the
SOE into a joint stock or limited liability company which oper-
ates subject to the 1934 Commercial Code. The new company
assumes all the rights and liabilities of its predecessor.3 95 The
second stage, the actual privatization, takes one of several
forms: "Public Offering"; "Trade Sale"; a combination of the
foregoing; auction; or via the special Mass Privatization pro-
gram which the government hopes will become its principal
tool.
To render public offerings possible, the State Treasury
was authorized to create a stock exchange3 96 which officially
ECONOMIC AND LEGAL INFORMATION FROM POLAND, No. 9-11, at 2-3 (Sept.-Nov. 1991)
[hereinafter ECONOMIC AND LEGAL INFORMATION].
394. Id.
395. Banasinski, supra note 357, at 772.
396. See Law of March 22, 1991 on Public Trading of Securities and Trust
Funds, Dziennik Ustaw of 1991, No. 35, Item 155. This statute regulates both the
primary and secondary markets in securities and provides the legal framework for the
creation of a Securities Commission, stock exchanges, securities firms and trust
funds. See ECONOMIC AND LEGAL INFORMATION, supra note 393, No. 7-8.
1992-19931 543
544 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 16:470
became operative in Warsaw in April 1991.97 The new stock
exchange, a joint stock company owned by the State Treasury,
operates under the supervision of a Securities Commission 398
and will eventually be privatized as well. In November 1990, it
had already been determined to adopt shareholder acquisition
disclosure rules incorporating the EC standards as set forth in
the Directive on Major Shareholdings.3 99 Acquisitions, in ex-
cess of an initial ten percent, and in stated increments thereaf-
ter, must be made public. 40 0 A previous statutory requirement
of a government permit for acquisitions by foreigners in excess
of ten percent was abolished.4 ° '
Like the 1934 Commercial Code, the new Warsaw stock
exchange also represents the continuation of the pre-World
War II free market tradition. The original Warsaw stock ex-
change had been established in 1871; a total of six stock ex-
changes, accounting for ninety percent of the country's trading
volume, existed in Warsaw in 1939.402 These were regulated
largely by the 1934 Commercial Code. As of this writing; there
are several dozen companies officially listed. Trading rules are
397. See Law of March 22, 1991 on Public Trading of Securities and Trust
Funds, Dziennik Ustaw of 1991, No. 35, Item 155, art. 1. Article 1(1) of the Polish
statute defines the public distribution of securities as "an offer to buy and the
purchase or transfer of the rights from securities issued in series, through mass me-
dia or in any other way, if an offer is addressed to more than 300 persons or to unspecified
persons." Id. (emphasis added).
Such a definition appears to neatly circumvent any necessity for minimum capital
or market capitalization rules. Cf. Council Directive No. 79/279 of March 5, 1979
Coordinating the Conditions for the Admission of Securities to Official Stock Ex-
change Listings, amending Admissions Directive, 22 OJ. L 66 (1979).
398. See Law of March 22, 1991 on Public Trading of Securities and Trust
Funds, Dziennik Ustaw of 1991, No. 35, Item 155, arts. 6-7. Articles 6 and 7 spell out
the composition and the functions of the Securities Commission, inter alia, the obli-
gation to "supervise observance of the rules of fair trade and competition in regard
to public trade and securities." Id. The Commission is empowered to issue broker-
age permits and has authorized new issuances of securities. Id. arts. 26, 27, 49, 50.
399. Cf Council Directive No. 88/627, O.J. L 348/62 (1988).
400. See Law of March 22, 1991 on Public Trading of Securities and Trust
Funds, Dziennik Ustaw of 1991, No. 35, Item 155, art. 72(1). Subparagraph (1) of
Article 72 requires, for example: "Anyone who has become the owner of company
securities which ensure him/her/it to have, respectively, 10, 20, 33, 50, 66, or 75
percent or more votes in the Stock-holders' Assembly, is required to notify the Com-
mission, the Anti-Monopoly Office, and the company within seven days of the fact."
Id.
401. See infra notes 413-16 and accompanying text (discussing 1991 Law on
Companies with Participation of Foreign Parties).
402. See ECONOMIC AND LEGAL INFORMATION, supra note 393.
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modeled on the French "par casier" and the German "Einheit-
spreis": for each traded issue, there is one trading price an-
nounced daily and all orders are offered "on the market" with
no in-house trading. All shares are in bearer form. The secur-
ities are kept as a global certificate for each issue in the Na-
tional Depository of Certificates.40 3 Currently planned is a Po-
lish government bond issue to be made available to foreign in-
vestors on the stock exchange bearing an interest rate linked to
the yield on three month Polish treasury bills. This issue is to
be accompanied by one year bonds available only to Polish citi-
zens bearing an interest rate tied directly to the rate of infla-
tion, plus five percent.40 4
ii. Trade Sales
The Trade Sale approach encompasses its own rules and
has proven most appropriate for large Western multinationals
since there are no comparable domestic investors with suffi-
cient resources. General Motors, Pepsico, Unilever, Phillips,
Gerber, and Henkel are a few examples of major partial acqui-
sitions of the most viable SOEs. A government official, usually
the "sectoral" specialist, prepares an information memoran-
dum and invites foreign investors to bid. The list of bidders is
culled and several are given access to the SOE's books to en-
gage in due diligence. Subsequently, the bidders submit a
binding price proposal and a restructuring plan to the MOP.
Concurrent negotiations then commence until an agreement is
reached with one of the bidders.40 5
iii. Mass Privatization Program
The Mass Privatization Program (the "MPP"), described
by Western experts as ingeniously complex,40 6 envisages the
403. Id. To date there have been over 100,000 people purchasing shares, of
which some 70,000 opened accounts with brokerage firms. Stock Market Still Slack,
ZYCIE WARSZAWY, Oct. 20, 1992, at 3, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
404. Proceeds are to be partially applied to the budget deficit. Christopher
Bobinski, Poland Offers Bonds to Foreign Investors, FIN. TIMES, May 12, 1992, at 28.
405. See ECONOMIC AND LEGAL INFORMATION, supra note 393.
406. Robinson, supra note 226. Not all Western economists have been equally
complimentary-a recent assessment by the Adam Smith Institute estimates that on
the average, it will take Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia some 28 years to priva-
tize even half of their enterprises. See, e.g., David Watts & Patrick Moser, East 'bank-
rupt in five years', TIMES, Oct. 20, 1992; Michael Simmons, Eastern Europe: Privatisation
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creation of National Wealth Management Funds ("NWMFs")
to act as the representative of all citizens of Poland, employees,
and the State Treasury.40 7 The NWMFs, to be managed by in-
ternational management firms, will be empowered to borrow
funds and to issue and sell shares to both foreign and domestic
investors. Polish citizens will receive, free-of-charge, "certifi-
cates of participation" which they will be able to trade publicly.
The program will affect some four hundred of the more attrac-
tive medium to large size SOEs, with at least US$7,000,000 in
turnover. These SOEs will be restructured as follows: ten per-
cent of the shares will be allocated to the employees, thirty
percent will be retained by the State, and the remaining por-
tion will be channeled into investment funds.40 8 Political disa-
greement has impeded significant progress on the MPP to
date, thus delaying a prime element in Poland's attempt to
achieve a market economy.40 9
b. Privatization Through Liquidation
The Privatization Act permits SOEs to transfer their assets
to private ownership by one of three methods: asset sale, joint
venture, or employee buy-out. All transactions are closely
monitored by and require the approval of the MOP.41 0 SOEs
in this process are referred to as "Founding Bodies"; the
Workers' Council of the SOE initially determines the chosen
method of privatization, subsequent to which a Preparatory
Team prepares and submits an opinion for MOP's approval.
Once approval is obtained, the chosen method is imple-
mented. Payment in installments is available for employee
buy-outs.
Dream 'A Sham', available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter Textline File, Oct. 19, 1992.
Mr. Simmons notes that "[t]he report, entitled Eastern Promise... is one of the most
thorough and pessimistic appraisals of eastern Europe since the collapse of commu-
nism in 1989 .... Up to two-thirds of state enterprises in each country are on the
brink of collapse." Id.
407. See Kim Reisman, Note, The World Bank and the IMF: At the Forefront of World
Transformation, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. S349, S363 (1992).
408. Poland Hopes for Private Sector to Pull Country Out of Recession, Int'l Bus. Daily
(BNA) (Jan. 6, 1992). In addition to privatization, the Polish government will direct
its energies to projects which will build up the country's infrastructure, including
transportation, telecommunications, and banking and financial services. Id.
409. Robinson, supra note 226.
410. Id.
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c. Other Aspects of Privatization-Municipal Property and
"Reprivatization" of Nationalized Property
As an integral part of undoing the legacy of communism,
all three Central European countries have had to confront the
issue of dealing with property which had been privately held
until it was confiscated or nationalized by the respective com-
munist regimes commencing in the late 1940s. The process of
returning such property is known as "reprivatization" and con-
stitutes another wrinkle in the economic and legal transition.
Hungary and Czechoslovakia have both adopted comprehen-
sive legislative schemes addressing the issue.411
In Poland, the government is reviewing some 72,000
claims for property nationalized under the 1946 Agrarian Re-
form Decree and the 1946 Act on the Nationalization of Indus-
try. The Polish government anticipates several hundred thou-
sand additional claims. By and large, legal experts agree that
to take the position that all communist-regime legislation is in-
valid is "risky" as well as absurd, because such legislation re-
sulted in legal consequences throughout the duration of the
communist regime. The approach advocated is to review all
such nationalizations with a view toward whether (1) they were
in "excess" of what was actually required by the state at that
time and/or (2) the state failed to provide adequate compensa-
tion for nationalized property under its own law.4 1 2 If cash
payments are made, the budgetary implications will be colos-
sal, if not crippling.
4. Law on Companies with Participation of Foreign Parties
Aimed exclusively at attracting and accelerating the pace
of foreign investment, the Law ofJune 14, 1991 on Companies
with Participation of Foreign Parties 413 (the "June 1991 Act")
embodies important assurances for potential investors. Arti-
cles 25 and 26 permit full repatriation of profits (after taxation)
and gains from the sale of shares or liquidation of a com-
411. See Chronology 1991, supra note 296.
412. Krzysztof Fronczak, Controversial Re-privatisation Bill-Interview with Wojciech
Goralczyk, Vice-Minister of Privatisation, ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE, Dec. 15, 1991, available in,
LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
413. Law of June 14, 1991 on Companies with Participation of Foreign Parties,
Dziennik Ustaw of 1991, No. 60, Item 253.
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pany.4 t4 TheJune 1991 Act eliminates prior requirements that
foreigners to obtain permits before acquiring shares in priva-
tized companies. Article 1(3) renders the formation, capitali-
zation, and activities of all such companies subject to the provi-
sions of the 1934 Commercial Code.4 t5 Article 42 establishes a
State Agency for Foreign Investment whose objective will be to
promote foreign investment. 41 6
5. "European" Legislation-Approximation of Laws
a. Activities in Anticipation of the Association Agreement
In early 1991, when association negotiations with the EC
were just getting under way, Poland created the office of
"Plenipotentiary for Foreign Assistance and Poland's Integra-
tion with Europe" and directed it to harmonize, coordinate,
and supervise the processes aimed at Poland's adaptation and
adjustment to the European Communities. With a view toward
initiating and organizing activities aimed at creating conditions
for Poland's economic and legal integration, a team of experts
was constituted to study the adjustment of the Polish legal sys-
tem to legislative regulations in the EC.4 t7 One result of this
activity was Poland's ability to put into effect the same customs
form utilized throughout the Community and EFTA, known as
the Single Administrative Document (the "SAD"), as of Janu-
ary 1, 1992, only two weeks after the conclusion of the agree-
ment with the EC.41 8 Similarly, efforts to incorporate EC re-
414. Id. ch. 3, arts. 25, 26. The mechanisms for such a transfer are illustrated by
Article 25:
1. A foreign entity, after payment of taxes due, is entitled to purchase for-
eign currencies in a foreign exchange bank, in the amount of profits paid by
the Company, on the basis of an individual certificate issued by the entity
authorized by the Minister of Finance, which performs an evaluation of the
yearly financial report (balance sheet) of the Company. 2. A foreign entity is
entitled to transfer abroad (transfer of profit) without separate foreign ex-
change permit, foreign currency purchased in a foreign exchange bank ac-
cording to paragraph 1.
Id. ch. 3, art. 25, 1, 2.
415. Id. ch. 1, art. 1, 3.
416. Id. ch. 5, art. 42.
417. Government's Plenipotentiary for Foreign Assistance and Poland's Integration with
Europe, PAP News Wire, Mar. 15, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
418. Miroslaw Glogowski, New Way to Declare, WARSAW VOICE, Dec. 22, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File. Active preparation for the SAD com-
menced in early fall 1991.
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quirements for product testing, labelling, certification, and
other standards were well under way in early 1991.419
b. Requirements of the Europe Agreement
The Community has insisted on full legal convergence on
the part of the three new associate countries to ensure their
effective economic integration. Articles 68 and 69 of the
Agreement with Poland call for approximation of numerous
aspects of existing Polish law to that in effect within the EC, as
well as adopting new legislation:
The Contracting Parties acknowledge that a condition pre-
cedent of the economic integration of Poland with the Com-
munities is the approximation of Polish legislation to the
Community's existing legislation. Poland undertakes to en-
sure the conformity of its future legislation with Community
legislation. The approximation of laws will include in par-
ticular the following areas: customs law, partnership law,
banking law, accounting and taxation of undertakings, intel-
lectual property, protection of workers in the workplace, fi-
nancial services, competition law, health and safety law, en-
vironmental protection of animal and plant life, consumer
protection, direct taxation, technical norms and standards,
transport and environmental protection.42 °
The Polish government confirmed its intention of prompt
adherence to the foregoing42 and after a long debate on the
relative merits and drawbacks of the Europe Agreement, the
Polish Parliament ratified the Agreement by a vote of 238 to 78
inJuly 1992.422 By a resolution also adopted inJuly 1992, Par-
liament directed the government to present a timetable for the
419. Poland-Economic Policy and Trade Practices, National Trade Data Bank, Feb.
1991, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, ALLEUR File.
420. Reprinted in Gazeta Bankowa, No. 4, Jan. 25, 1992 (translated by Author).
421. We Must Mobilize Forces Anew, Premier Says, PAP News Wire, Dec. 21, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
422. Polish Parliament Ratifies EC Association Accord, Reuter Libr. Rep., July 4,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File. There were also 20 abstentions.
Id. Some Polish parliamentarians felt that ratification should be held in abeyance
until the agricultural sector is sufficiently restructured to enable Poland's farmers to
meet Western competition. Sejm Concerned Over Agriculture Provisions in Polish-EC
Treaty, supra note 243. It is safe to say that a number of Polish parliamentary commit-
tees took a hard look at the association agreement and asked tough questions con-
cerning the agreement's impact on Polish sovereignty and the precise fiscal effects of
ratification as opposed to rejection.
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harmonization process by the end of January, 1993.423
In a joint agreement with Hungary and Czechoslovakia,
Poland has drafted legislation incorporating EC rules of origin
and has submitted it to Community officials for verification of
compliance with EC rule.424 Poland and Hungary recently an-
nounced their intent to work jointly on adjusting their internal
legislation to meet EC standards. 425  The Polish government
has approved three draft laws incorporating EC laws on inven-
tions and patent protection.426 Projected for presentation to
the Seym is a draft economic and social policy. 427 Efforts are
under way to bring the overall development of rural areas and
farming closer to the EC standard.42 8
Certain Western analysts have suggested that compliance
with EC mandates may actually serve to expedite legislative
logjams 429 and represents an effective means of resolving at
least part of the difficult challenges ahead. 430 There appears to
be significant merit in this observation since the unifyingforce
underlying Polish foreign policy is, as has been discussed, at-
taining EC membership.4 3' It is to be hoped that measures
which might otherwise encounter parliamentary debate, delay
or inaction, will be propelled by this force. Poland's Foreign
Minister recently opined that the economic obligations under-
taken by Poland in the Europe Agreement will accelerate re-
structuring of the Polish economy and will ultimately produce
economic stabilization.43 2
423. Conference on Harmonizing Poland's and EC Laws Starts Thursday, PAP News
Wire, Oct. 23, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File. Officials also
stress that harmonization must take place within the larger context of economic re-
form as well as being addressed legislatively. Id.
424. Czechoslovak-Hungarian-Polish Separate Trade Agreement in Sight, MTI Hun-
garian News Agency, Mar. 13, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
425. Poland, Hungary to Cooperate in Adjusting Laws to EC Standards, PAP News
Wire, Sept. 24, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
426. Government Discusses Plans for Privatisation and Reprivatisation, BBC, Summary
of World Broadcasts, Mar. 12, 1992, at EE/1327/B/1, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, OMNI File.
427. We Must Mobilize Forces Anew, Premier Says, supra note 421.
428. Id.
429. Roger Boyes, Freedom Fighters Choose New Chains, TiMEs, Dec. 19, 1991.
430. Krause & Schmidt, supra note 23.
431. See supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text (discussing Poland's goal of
EC Membership).
432. Skubiszewski Says Treaty with EC Will Accelerate Reforms, PAP News Wire, May
26, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
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Certain legal sectors are well advanced in the approxima-
tion process. The Anti-Monopoly office has identified the or-
der in which EC competition laws will be approximated.433
One reason for urgency is that market partitioning for prod-
ucts manufactured under Western licenses was a standard term
in licensing agreements entered into between Polish and West-
ern companies in the 1970s, and Poland wants to compel the
renegotiation of such agreements.43 4
D. The Polish Foreign Debt-A Major Obstacle to Attainment of a
Market Economy
In the early 1970s, the Communist regime in Poland com-
menced amassing enormous foreign debt as it made massive
purchases of Western licensing and consumer goods in an ef-
fort to placate popular dissatisfaction and unrest. After impos-
ing martial law in 1981 and outlawing Solidarity and other hot-
beds of political reform, the regime ceased making interest
payments on outstanding debt to Western governments when
the latter endeavored to ostracize Poland for the new political
repressions. This resulted in the steady accrual of additional
debt. The IMF recently estimated the total size of Polish for-
eign debt at US$45,900,000,000, 43 5 of which about two-thirds
is owed to western governmental entities such as the U.S. Ex-
port-Import Bank, the Commodity Credit Bank, and their
counterparts in other countries.
The post-communist government thus inherited a debt
service obligation of such enormous proportions that it threat-
ens to undermine any significant economic progress. Consis-
tent with their stated policy of buttressing Poland's economic
transition, Western governments have had little choice but to
forgive progressive chunks of the overall governmental debt.
In March 1991, the Paris Club of government creditors agreed
433. Fornalczyk, supra note 231. "We have selected five sets of [EEC] regula-
tions we would like to apply here to start with: on patent and know-how agreements,
mergers and equity buy-outs, commercial agreements providing for granting exclu-
sive rights, and cooperation among businesses." Id.
434. Id.
435. The total foreign debt of the former "East European" countries is roughly
US$100,000,000,000: Hungary (US$20,000,000,000); Yugoslavia (US$16,000,-
000,000); Bulgaria (US$10,000,000,000); Czechoslovakia (US$7,000,000,000);
Romania (US$1,000,000,000). UN Economic Commission for Europe, Economic Sur-
vey of Europe in 1990-1991, reprinted in PINDER, supra note 117, at 52.
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to waive thirty percent of Poland's US$33,000,000,000 govern-
ment debt with an additional twenty percent to be forgiven in
April 1994 if Poland fulfills economic conditions set by the
IMF.436 Washington, D.C. in turn forgave about seventy per-
cent of Poland's outstanding debt to the United States of some
US$3,670,000,000. Germany announced it was forgiving
roughly half of a US$5,500,000,000 debt owed by Poland to
the German government in efforts to support Poland's transi-
tion to a market economy.437 Belgium has just become the
fourteenth country to agree to a significant reduction of Po-
land's debt.43 8
The future of the additional twenty percent debt reduction
offered by the Paris Club is conditioned on Poland achieving
and maintaining a budget deficit of no more than five percent
of gross national product, an IMF-mandated formula. Po-
land's earlier inability to stay within accepted targets resulted
in the suspension of a three-year, US$2,500,000,000 credit
package granted by the IMF.43 9
Virtually concurrent with the election of Waldemar Pawlak
as Poland's new Prime Minister, the Seym approved a budget
which does meet the five percent budget deficit limitation set
by the IMF.44 °
E. Rejoining the West-Other Aspects of the Polish Endeavor
The growing status and role of the three newest EC asso-
ciates is increasingly evident. In March 1992, they were for the
first time invited to participate in a scientific council sponsored
by OECD Member States,441 and may soon be assigned a lim-
436. Poland: Sponsored Section-Debt Relief-An Important Breakthrough, Reuter
Textline, Aug. 30, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
437. Ferdinand Protzman, Bonn Cancels Half of Debt Poland Owes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
20, 1992, at D3; Germany to Forgive Half of Poland's Official Debt, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONI-
TOR, Feb. 20, 1992, at 4.
438. Belgium reduced the debt of $305,000,000 by 30% effective immediately,
and will further reduce by another 20% between 1994-2009 contingent upon Po-
land's compliance with the IMF mandated budgetary standards. Belgium to Reduce Po-
land's Debt, POLISH NEws BULL., June 4, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
OMNI File.
439. Stephen Engelberg, Polish Government Completes a Budget Approved by I.M.F.,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1992, at A9.
440. Philippa Fletcher, Poland's Young New Premier Takes Up the Challenge, Reuters,
June 6, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
441. CSFR-Hungarian-Polish Representation for First Time at OECD Conference, BBC,
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ited role at EC summit meetings.
The range of Polish activities directed at closer ties with
the Community is by no means limited to the four corners of
the Europe Agreement nor are Poland's efforts to rejoin the
West limited to the EC. Significantly, Poland's democratic re-
forms have enabled it to meet the qualifications for admission
to the Council of Europe, in which it now participates as a full
member.44 2 Poland has also joined, as noted above, newer
groupings such as the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and
the Baltic Cooperation Council. 443 The measures Poland is
taking are intended not only to improve its chances for acces-
sion to the European Community but to take what it considers
its rightful place in the community of nations. With these
objectives in mind, Poland, in January 1992, became one of the
original signatory parties to the European Energy Charter
which will ultimately result in concrete sectoral protocols on
energy-related matters on a European basis.444 Poland has
agreed, as have other Central and Eastern European states,
with the EC's European Parliament to collaborate on a pan-
European Transport Charter.445
Poland is currently renegotiating its protocol with
GATT.44 6 Consistent with its amending of the 1952 constitu-
tion with a declaration that Poland is "a law-abiding state," it
was the first East European state to file a declaration with the
United Nations accepting the jurisdiction of the International
Summary of World Broadcasts, Mar. 13, 1992, at EE/1328/AI/1, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, OMNI File.
442. Bielecki 's Government Presents State of Nation Report, supra note 297. Participa-
tion in the Council of Europe has great meaning for the new democracies: "Council
membership is coveted as a stepping stone [sic] to the economic privileges of mem-
bership in the European Community. As proof of a functioning parliamentary de-
mocracy, membership is also a seal of approval that can open the door to credit lines
in Western money markets." George D. Moffett III, European Body's Role Expands,
CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR, Feb. 12, 1992, at 9.
443. See supra notes 214-16 and accompanying text (discussing Poland's new
membership in international organizations).
444. In addition to the EC Member States, the EFTA nations, 12 former Soviet
republics, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary are participants. 12 Former Soviet
Republics are Among Signers of European Energy Charter, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 37 (Jan.
1, 1992).
445. EC/Eastern Europe: MEPS for Social Market Economy, Transport Europe, Oct.
29, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
446. Poland's Economic Programme: Stabilisation & Transition to the Market Economy,
PAP News Wire, May 10, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
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Court of Justice. 447 Poland has also entered into a series of
bilateral friendship treaties with individual EC Member
States.448 The most important treaties are two agreements en-
tered into with reunited Germany: the first, in November
1990, which assures the Polish western border with Germany,
and a Treaty on Good Neighborliness and Friendly Coopera-
tion in June 1991.449
Movement toward regional cooperation has increased
steadily. Poland has joined the -"Pentagonale" group, formed
in 1989 by Austria and Italy to funnel technical expertise and
resources to Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and, initially, Yugosla-
via.450 Cooperation along the lines of the "Visegrad trio" is
manifesting itself in the form of joint communications to the
EC,4 5 1 and is anticipated to increase with the establishment of
a free-trade zone in 1993 modeled both on the Europe Agree-
ments and the EEA.452 Polish and German representatives
have recently met to explore the feasibility of a "Pomeranian
Euroregion." 4 535
Relations with the EFTA countries are taking on increas-
ing momentum as the EFTA countries move steadily toward
closer economic cooperation with the countries of Eastern
447. Renata Szafarz, Poland Accepts the Optional Clause of the ICJ Statute, 85 AM. J.
INT'L L. 374 (1991).
448. Adam Bromke, Polish-Western Relations in a New Way, SZTANDAR MLODYCH,
Nov. 8-11, 1991, at 1 (Germany, France, Italy, Britain, and the U.S.).
449. See Wladyslaw Czaplinski, The New Polish-German Treaties and the Changing
Political Structure of Europe, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 163 (1992).
450. MERRITr, supra note 14, at 46.
451. The three countries agreed some time ago to link forces to expedite and
coordinate their respective efforts for speedy accession to the EC via increased eco-
nomic, political, and security cooperation amongst themselves. Vaclav Havel of the
CSFR remarked that "[w]e agreed that we will apply to the European Community
together ... if we join our voices, our demands will be heard more strongly, than if
we act individually." Ariane Genillard, EC Applicants Seek to Speed Entry: Czechs, Poles,
and Hungarians to Step Up Co-operation, FIN. TIMES, May 7, 1992, at 2.
452. Poland, Hungary to Cooperate in Adjusting Laws to EC Standards, PAP News
Wire, Sept. 24, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File. It appears to be
Hungary which was the impetus behind proposals for greater economic and military
cooperation. See, e.g., Antall-Defence Ministers of Visegrad Triangle, MTI Econews, Mar. 6,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File; Jonathan Lynn, Three East Euro-
pean States Prepare Trade Zone, Reuters, Mar. 24, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, OMNI File.
453. Pomeranian Euroregion Discussed by Polish, German Officials, PAP News Wire,
Oct. 20, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
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Europe.4 54 Hungary and Poland are in the final phases of ne-
gotiating free trade agreements with the EFTA countries,455
whereas Czechoslovakia and EFTA have already formally con-
cluded such an agreement.456 Clearly, EFTA has been en-
gaged in an outreach effort to the Central and Eastern Euro-
pean countries, supplying them with advice on matters perti-
nent to a free-market economy and endorsing their future
participation as observers at EFTA consumer protection board
meetings.4  As mentioned above, Poland would not like to
see membership in EFTA as a mandatory condition precedent
to EC membership. Notwithstanding this, entry into EFTA is
an option Poland may be wise to consider. The relative ease
with which the current EFTA applicants will be taken into the
EC fold and the fact that EFTA will likely have no alternative
but to take in new countries or else cease to exist when most of
its present membership "defects" to the EC, indicates that
even as an "antechamber," EFTA could provide significant
benefits on the road to European integration.
VI. PRIOR ACCESSIONS TO THE EC-A USABLE
BLUEPRINT FOR POLAND?
A. "Approfondisement Ou Elargissement"--The
Longstanding Debate458
The question of whether the Community should "widen,"
that is, expand to admit new Member States, or direct its ef-
forts at "deepening" the internal ties between existing mem-
bers dates back many years and is not merely a by-product of
the current drive of "1992." The Commission is preparing a
report on the implications of enlargement. Following the ac-
454. With EEA" Treaty in Limbo, EFTA Countries Look East, Eurowatch, Mar. 6,
1992, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, ALLEUR File. Czechoslovakia and EFTA
already have in place a free trade agreement. EFTA Initials First Trade Agreement with
Eastern European Country, Eurowatch, Mar. 20, 1992, available in LEXIS, Europe Li-
brary, ALLEUR File.
455. Hungary and Poland are reportedly "holding out" for greater trade con-
cessions in the area of unprocessed farm products. See Hungary and EFTA, MTI
Econews, Mar. 4, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
456. EFTA Initials First Trade Agreement with Eastern European Country, supra note
454.
457. Consumer Protection Laws Lacking in 'New' Eastern Europe, Says EFTA,
Eurowatch, Mar. 20, 1992, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, ALLEUR File.
458. Dagtoglou, supra note 15, at 153.
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cession of Spain and Portugal in 1986 and the enactment of
the SEA, the objective of "deepening" internal Community
ties was, as noted above, generally acknowledged and accepted
as having greater immediacy. But, just as today the Commu-
nity views Eastern Europe as an entirely new frontier and ques-
tions the suitability of those countries to join the ranks of
Member States, the Community once viewed the admission of
the "southern states" of Europe, Greece, Portugal, and Spain
with the same misgivings.459 It is instructive to look back to
the early 1980s, when Greece had already joined but lengthy
negotiations with Spain and Portugal were still ongoing, and
examine contemporaneous discussions of the Community's
perception of the difficulties of integrating new members.46 °
One concern was the perceived loss of economic and social
"homogeneity" that southern accession would entail. There
also existed a fear of mass workers' migrations to the wealthier
northern states. Further, the agricultural output of the south
was largely incompatible with the CAP. These same reserva-
tions are recognizable in the present day context of the East.
Not only are the subjective criteria reminiscent thereof but the
economic deficiencies are not dissimilar to those once preva-
lent in southern Europe.46 '
Such similarities have not escaped the notice of current
membership hopefuls. Leszek Balcerowicz462 of Poland, ob-
served that while he does not anticipate EC membership in less
than a decade, it should be viewed as within reasonable reach.
"We are following a path that has already been cleared. Other
countries, poorer and less industrialised than the six founding
members, have followed this path before us: Spain, Greece,
Portugal .... We are by no means unique with our poverty,
459. See generally id.
460. Id.
461. Id. at 151-52. The common "shortcomings" of the southern states, as
identified by Dagtoglou below, are arguably equally apposite to the East Central Eu-
ropean countries today: "(i)-The infrastructure of their economy is still at a low
level (ii)-Their industrial productivity is low by EC standards (iii)-Their agricul-
tural productivity is low by EC standards (iv) Their agriculture does not produce
mainly C.A.P. favoured products." Id. at 151.
462. Former Minister of Finance and the author of the economic "shock poli-
cies."
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under-development and our objections .... 4 6 3 Other observ-
ers discern additional parallels; not unlike Spain and Portugal
in the 1970s and early 1980s, political parties in the new de-
mocracies are led by well-known personalities (e.g., Vaclav
Havel in Czechoslovakia, Lech Walesa in Poland) whose polit-
ical parties suffer from internal divisions and difficulty in en-
forcing their political will.4 64
The Community-wide social "homogeneity" which the EC
once preserved zealously is a thing of the past, but it is likely to
become a regional phenomenon in the Community of the fu-
ture. Just as the southern states have certain aspects in com-
mon, so do the Central European nations. The nordic coun-
tries that will probably accede to the EC may share an even
greater number of characteristics in common than the first two
groupings, ranging from a uniform religious orientation to a
keen commitment to social welfare and "their belief in the su-
periority of the Scandinavian social model. 465
B. Mechanisms Developed by the Community for Dealing with Less
Affluent Member States
For numerous years prior to its recent activities aimed at
Eastern Europe, the Community itself had extensive experi-
ence with development aid, both externally and, more impor-
tantly, on an intra-Community basis. This experience has ren-
dered possible the successful integration of "poorer" Member
States such as Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Northern Ireland,
and parts of Spain and Italy that were significantly less devel-
oped than the states comprising the Community at the time of
their accession. Integration, however, is an ongoing process,
and the Community's chosen methods of effectuating it under-
score that less developed countries have not been expected un-
realistically to catch up in less than sufficient time frames.
The enactment of the SEA 46 6 brought into the EEC Treaty
a stated commitment, via Article 130(a), to attain "economic
and social cohesion" by reducing the disparities between the
463. Agreement with EEC Signed, GAZETA WYBORCZA, No. 293, Dec. 17, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
464. See id.
465. Max Jakobson, Here Comes a Nordic Invasion of Unwary Europe, IrNr'L HERALD
TRIB., Mar. 11, 1992.
466. Single European Act, supra note 3, § III (v), art. 23.
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various regions and the backwardness of the least-favored ar-
eas.46 7 Article 130(b) of the EEC Treaty addresses a series of
fiscal mechanisms aimed at promoting economic growth in the
above-referenced regions by establishing "structural funds"
for these purposes.468 These mechanisms are known as the
"European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund," the
"European Regional Development Fund," and the "European
Social Fund." They are financed largely by the European In-
vestment Bank. Illustrative of the Community's emphasis on
propelling lagging economic areas to greater productivity and
prosperity is the fact that the structural funds are set to double
as of 1993.469 All southern Member States, including portions
of Italy, and Ireland head the list of top-priority recipients.4 70
The EC has drawn its official "poverty" line as being be-
low fifty percent of the average EC Gross Domestic Product
("GDP"). It is telling to note that as recently as 1990, Portu-
gal's GDP was fifty-three percent of the EC average, Greece's
was fifty-eight percent and Ireland's was sixty-three percent.47'
In contrast, Czechoslovakia and Hungary were sixty-six per-
cent and fifty-three percent respectively.472 Portuguese farm-
ing, for example, even several years after accession, continued
to consist predominantly of subsistence farming, and contin-
ued to be the least productive in Europe, as it had been for
twenty-five years.473 It remains uncertain whether the Portu-
guese will be able to reach EC farming standards prior to the
467. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 130(a).
468. Id. art. 130(b).
469. Regional Policy: The "Paquet Delors II -- Building on the 1988 Reform of the
Structural Funds, RAPID, Feb. 12, 1992, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, ALLEUR
File.
470. Id.
471. Europe's Open Future, ECONOMIST, Feb. 22, 1992, at 47.
472. Id.
473. Merril Stevenson, Another New World: More Do Less, ECONOMIST, May 28,
1988, at 31. Portugal had major agricultural obstacles to overcome as it joined the
Community: the technical level of farming was significantly lower than in the rest of
the EC; its agricultural prices were substantially higher; and the prospect loomed of
massive underemployed farm workers as farming becomes more efficient. In the first
five-year phase of EC transition, Portugal had the sizeable task of developing EC-
style market organizations, liberalizing prices, and abolishing state subsidies. Portu-
gal initially received ECU700,000,000 from Brussels to reorganize its agriculture.
More than 8000 improvement projects were approved in 1987 alone for improving
rural roads, irrigation, electrification, technical training, and commercial marketing
structures. Id.
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end of this decade.474
In the case of the southern expansion of the EC, interna-
tional and domestic awareness of the Community's commit-
ment to extend future membership to Portugal and Spain exer-
cised a steadying influence on their evolving democracies over
an eight-year period. The ramifications of this concrete illus-
tration of the Community's support for their political reforms
represented not only a symbolic benefit but also a de facto step
in the direction of preserving peace and liberty, as foreseen by
the drafters of the EEC Treaty.4 75
CONCLUSION
At the outset of this discussion, reference was made to
Professor Frowein's conviction that the nature of today's Euro-
pean Community cannot be grasped without some understand-
ing of the last six decades of European history. 476 The critical
historical juncture for the emergence of the Community arose
from the overall devastation wrought on its Member States by
World War II. The massive reconstruction effort implemented
at the Western end of Europe under the auspices of the Mar-
shall Plan rendered possible the reintroduction of democratic
institutions and industrial revitalization of those very countries
which now form the core of the Community's present affluence
and influence, in particular Germany and France.
Eastern Europe, caught by Stalinism, was arbitrarily de-
prived of these benefits and instead was forced to mold its
post-war recovery along the lines of an impracticable, primi-
tive, and economically unworkable ideology-communism.
On the heels of the very recent demise of communism as the
centrifugal force in the region, countries such as Poland are
now attempting wholeheartedly to retrace four decades of eco-
nomic and political divergence from their western neighbors
and trying to compress this vastly difficult and complex process
into a span of several years, albeit without any certainty of suc-
cess. Astutely, they have assessed their chances of success as
474. Id.
475. Nancy Weingardt, Portugal's Accession and Integration Into the European Eco-
nomic Community, 15 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 317 (1987).
476. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing Professor Frowein's
thoughts for the future of the EC).
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being best assured by prompt entry into the EC fold. History
demonstrates that EC membership has worked wonders for the
economies of the southern tier of EC Member States and there
is little doubt it would do the same for countries such as Po-
land. In the not-so-distant past, the very existence of definite
membership prospects played a role in solidly entrenching the
processes of democratic government in Greece, Portugal and
Spain. The critical question, therefore, is just how far along on
the path to a free market economy will Poland need to be
before the EC fully opens the door?
The EC's new "union" treaty codifies the concept that
Member States may proceed at varying speeds toward the
achievement of common objectives such as monetary union.
The Community now appears cognizant of the ultimate inevi-
tability of a future expansion which will include the East Cen-
tral European countries and even members of the current Con-
federation of Independent States. In the immediate future,
this recognition will be actively carried forward by the UK and
by Germany. It is clear that from the EC's overall point of
view, the proverbial ball is largely in the court of the aspiring
members; the association agreement provide only chances, not
assurances. However, it is equally clear that without continued
active financial and technical assistance on the part of the EC
and its western industrialized partners, the full breadth and
scope of economic transition will be very difficult to complete.
Poland must therefore persevere in its transitional efforts
and should give some thought to improving its public, interna-
tional image, which the Western press has recently been por-
traying as increasingly xenophobic and inclined to await fur-
ther Western handouts passively. Concrete recommendations,
synthesized from various sources, include the following:
(1) continue to expand regional trade and political coop-
eration with Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the Baltic states,
drawing on the EC-EFTA experience.
(2) maximize the "political dialogue" aspect of the Eu-
rope Agreement and continue to align external foreign policy
with that of the EC as it has done with the recognition of the
Ukraine and Byelorussia, for example.
(3) increase its domestic pool of expertise in EC law and
languages to ensure that Polish representatives are vested with
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both substantive knowledge and as the ability to make Poland's
voice heard on all matters of common interest.
Brussels, like Washington, is a forum accustomed to the
well-organized lobbying activities of foreign interests. How-
ever, unlike in the United States, Poland lacks the equivalent of
a powerful Polish-American lobby, and must therefore expedi-
tiously acquire and utilize the skills necessary to convey its
opinions and concerns to Community officials.
The EC, in turn, should consider whether the almost inev-
itable revamping of its wasteful Common Agricultural Policy
could not also be utilized to successfully market, on a world-
wide scale, those agricultural products of which Poland is al-
ready a net exporter. Revenues generated could be applied to
uses similar to those of the existing structural funds.
The southern expansion of the EC was long preceded by
agreement "in principle" that those nations should be granted
membership status; a similar phenomenon is now gaining mo-
mentum throughout the Community as regards Central Eu-
rope. In the case of its southern neighbors, the Community
acknowledged that their accession represented a joint and
profitable "investment in the democratic future of Europe. 4 7 7
It is now appropriate, and in fact imperative, that the Commu-
nity apply the lesson learned to its eastern neighbors as well.
Otherwise, borrowing Professor Weiler's words, "we have
made little progress if the Us becomes European (instead of
German or French or British) and the Them becomes those
outside the Community or those inside who do not enjoy the
privileges of citizenship. '478
477. Dagtoglou, supra note 15, at 162, (citing 2 EC BULL., No. 1, 6, 10 (1977)).
478. Weiler, supra note 70, at 2482.
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